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Abstract
Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) is called a nominalist, even though
his published works contain no developed philosophical doctrine. Yet, in order
to understand and interpret his logical systems, we must understand his
nominalism. This thesis will investigate, in detail, the philosophical origins of
the "nominalistic" elements ofLesniewski 1s logical systems and will offer a
characterization of his nominalism.
1

This thesis will provide a brief historical sketch ofLesniewski s career as
a logician and of the times in which his logical systems were developed. A
definition of nominalism will be developed within the context of the
realist/nominalist debate over the existence of universals and a realists notion
of universals will be given as a background against which Lesniewski's
philosophical beliefs can be measured. The philosophical origins of
Lesniewski's nominalism will be explored and will provide the basis for an
examination of the nominalistic elements of his logical systems and the basis
for a characterization of his nominalism.
Lesniewski's nominalism avoids traditional classification and can only
be examined indirectly through an analysis of his logical systems and through
his attitude towards Russellian classes. In the final analysis, it is best to say
that Lesniewski was a philosopher who created consistent logical systems in
which to "talk" about objects.
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Introduction:
Stanislaw Lesniewski (1886-1939) taught logic at Warsaw University
between the First and Second World Wars . He developed three logical systems
- Mereology, Ontology and Protothetic - which he believed would provide a more
sound basis for mathematics than the other logical systems in use at that
time, especially the logical system developed by Whitehead and Russell in
Principia Mathematica.
Lesniewski is called a nominalist, even though his published works
contain no developed philosophical doctrine. Yet, in order to understand and
interpret his logical systems, we must understand his nominalism. This thesis
will investigate, in detail, the "nominalistic" elements ofLesniewski's logical
systems and will offer a more precise characterization of his nominalism.
In order to investigate the origin ofLesniewski's nominalism and to more
precisely characterize his philosophical tendencies, this thesis will provide a
brief historical sketch ofLesniewski's career as a logician and of the times in
which his logical systems were developed. A definition of nominalism will be
developed within the context of the realist/nominalist debate over the existence
of universals and a realists notion of universals will be given as a background
against which Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs can be measured. The
philosophical origins ofLesniewski's nominalism will be explored and will
provide the basis for an examination of the nominalistic elements of his logical
systems and the basis for a characterization of his nominalism.

1

Chapter I - Background
1) A Brief Historical Sketch 1
Stanislaw Lesniewski was born on March 30, 1886. Although the
history of his university training is not complete , it is known that he spent at
least some of his university days in Munich where he attended lectures by
Hans Cornelius. Lesniewski came to Lvov University in 1910 to study logic
and completed his doctoral work under the direction ofKazimierz Twardowski
in 1912. Lesniewski characterized his student days in the following way .
Steeped in the influence of John Stuart Mill in which I mainly grew up ,
and 'conditioned' by the problems of'universal -grammar' and oflogicosemantics in the style of Edward Husserl and by the exponents of the
so-called Austrian School, I ineffectually attacked the foundations of
'logistic' from this point of view. 2
Lesniewski was first introduced to modern symbolic logic in 1910 when
he read Jan Lukasiewicz's 11On The Principle Of Contradiction In Aristotle.

11

Lesniewski focused on Russell's Paradox involving the 11class of all classes not
subordinated to themselves" for 11 years (1911 through 1922). During his
"initial period" (1911 through 1914), Lesniewski published seven papers which
he later repudiated as immature works . He lived in Moscow during the First
World War (1915 through 1918). In 1916, Lesniewski's published
"Foundations of the General Theory of Sets" which can clearly be taken as a
"bridge between Lesniewski's early and later writings." Lesniewski's mature
period extended from 1916 until his death in 1939. Lesniewski's most
important published work, "On the Foundations of Mathematics ," was
1 The facts in this brief summary of Lesniewski ' philosophical career and his intellectual
development have been extracted mainly from two sources: Jan Wolenski 's book , Logic And
Philosophy In the Lvov-Warsaw School , and the Introduction to Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works.
2 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans . D. I.
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 , p. 181.

2

published from 1927 through 1931 as a series of journal articles. Lesniewski
published little in his lifetime. All of his personal papers were destroyed near
the end of the Second World War. The list of lecture topics Lesniewski
delivered at Warsaw University from 1919 through 1939 contained on pages
xii and xiii of"Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works" are .a most valuable

source of information because Lesniewski presented the details of his logical
discoveries in his lectures. The list of his lectures, therefore, is a helpful outline
of the development of his logical systems .
2) Lesniewski's Logical Systems
Lesniewski developed three logical systems during his mature period:
Protothetic, Ontology, and Mereology. Lesniewski was not concerned with
formal semantics

3;

his work, therefore, was mainly focused on the syntactic

development of his logical systems. Because Lesniewski developed a highly
unique symbolism for his logical systems and, formally, he favored the
axiomatic development of his systems, his published works are difficult to
access . In his lectures, however , Lesniewski adopted the more common
Peano/Russell notation and developed his systems using the method of natural
deduction . Even though there has been considerable work by others in
presenting the formal features ofLesniewski 1s logical systems, his logical
systems are still not as accessible as the logic of Whitehead and Russell. In
order to understand Lesniewski's logical systems, it is necessary not only ot
read the literature, but also to actually work with his systems, even if one
akeady has a familiarity with the logic of Whitehead and Russell .
The primitive terms ofProtothetic, Ontology, and Mereology are" =", "i/ 1,
and "part" ("cz" in Polish), respectively, as well as the quantifier. The axiom(s)
3

Frederick V. Rickey, ("Interpretations ofLesniewski 's Ontology ", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No. 3
(1985), pp . 182 through 184.), gives an account of what he believes Lesniewski's informal
semantics were.

3

of each logical system 11defines 11 the primitive term of that system by its use in
the axiom(s). The quantifier, however , is not "defined" in the same way; its
11

definition 11 will be the subject of much discussion in the Chapter IV below.
Protothetic is very similar to a quantified propositional calculus; it is

based on a single axiom which 11defines 11 equivalence.
Ontology is similar to a quantified predicate calculus, except that [A]
a(A) in Whitehead and Russell's system would be written [Aa] (A£ a) in
Ontology (in my examples, I have used the same shaped variables in order to
make the comparison more obvious) and, unlike [A] a(A), where 11A 11 and 11a 11
refer to two different kinds of things , i.e. objects and their properties
respectively,

A 11 and 11a 11 in Lesniewski's system refer to only one kind of thing,

11

namely, objects. Ontology is based on the single axiom:
[Aa]::AEa.=:.[B] BEA:.[CD] CEADEA.=:).C£D:.[E]E£A.=:).E£a
A helpful English translation of 11A£a 11 might read 11A is the a 11 or 11A is one of the
a's, 11 but 11A£a11 for Lesniewski is most correctly 11defined 11 by the use of 11£11 in the
Axiom of Ontology.
Mereology is a deductive system Lesniewski designed to treat parts and
wholes . Logically, Mereology is built on Ontology and Ontology is built on
The order in which Lesniewski constructed these systems,

Protothetic.

however, is just the reverse. As we will see, Lesniewski constructed Mereology
in order to 11define 11 class as something no different from its members.
Mereology is not based on a single axiom. It will be sufficient in the
introduction, however, to present the first axiom ofMereology along with an
English translation of that axiom. The first axiom ofMereology is :
[P,Q]:P£cz(Q).=:).Q£N(cz(P)).
This axiom might most easily be understood if translated into the English
sentence:

11

If Pis one of the parts of Q, then Q is not one of the parts of P. 11 If
4

applied to botany , the first axiom of Ontology might be translated by the
following English sentence : "If a cell is one of the parts of a leaf, then a leaf is
not one of the parts of a cell." Lesniewski would agree to these translations
only in so far as they are helpful in understanding the first axiom of Mereology.
Each logical system "grows," theses are derived, according to directives,
i.e . very precise rules of transformation/inference,

which are directly related to

the axiom of each logical system through terminological explanations which
develop the "vocabulary" of the directives through direct reference to the
axioms of the logical system. Lesniewski's terminological explanations and his
directives are not proper parts of his logical systems. The shapes of
parentheses surrounding the variables of all Lesniewski's logical systems
"mark" the semantic category of expressions which can be substituted for
those variables .
Lesniewski's logical systems are carefully constructed to avoid the
possibility of contradiction and to avoid the lack of precision he detected in
other logical systems , e.g. the logical systems of Whitehead and Russell ,
Chwistek , Fraenkel, Zermelo and Frege. A good example of Lesniewski's own
precision is his extended treatment of the use of the turnstile in Whitehead and
Russell's Principia Mathematica .4
3) The Polish School Of Logic
The Polish School of Logic played a significant role in the development of
logic between the First and the Second World Wars. In their written works
there is the energy and enthusiasm of people engaged in an important
intellectual mission. They supported one another; they shared a common
enthusiasm for discovery; and, most importantly , they did not accept the
4

Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On the Foundation of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I . Barnett , Trans . D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991 , pp . 181 - 196.

5

limits of any philosophical doctrine. The tone of the Polish School was mainly a
result of the influence ofKazimierz Twardowski who was the father of modern
Polish philosophy. Lesniewski studied with Twardowski and, it seems, was
imbued with the high standards of precision which Twardowski instilled in all of
bis students.
Twardowski also represented a certain moral attitude towards
philosophy, which he tried to convey to bis disciples. It was bis
belief that philosophy is the true school of the spirit because it
creates important moral ideals and defends them. This fact must
be very strongly emphasized because the ideological unity of the
Lvov-Warsaw School consisted among other things in a very
serious treatment of philosophical enquiries and the teaching of
philosophy, in treating philosophy and its propagation as an
intellectual and moral mission. 5
It is easy to detect in Lesniewski's writing the tone of intellectual
mission Twardowski's students shared. Twardowski succeeded in inspiring
students with a variety of interests because he did not impose any definite
philosophical doctrine on them.
Now Twardowski - and later bis successors - did not impose
upon bis disciples any definite philosophical doctrine. His primary
goal was to teach them above all a clear and critical way of
thinking. It seems that bis philosophical minimalism was an
intended element of the total conception of building philosophy in
Poland. 6
Lesniewski lived in an exciting time for the logicians of the Polish School,
a time when they believed that it was possible to develop with logic a "general
theory of existence" 7 or to discover through logic "unshakable and eternal
truths.

118 The

excitement found at the Polish School was not the result of a

5

Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-W arsaw School, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 5.
6 Ibid., p. 5.
7 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Brunett, Trans. D. I.
Brunett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 374 .
8 Jan Lukasiewicz, "In Defence Of Logistic", Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works, Ed. L.
Borkowski, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970, p . 249 .

6

belief that answers to the questions of philosophy are beyond the reach of man,
but was partially the result of a hope that logic might provide the basis for
important discoveries with sweeping implications for human knowledge. Even
though Lesniewski almost completely concentrated his efforts on the
development of his logical systems in order to provide a consistent logical
foundation for mathematics and avoided traditional problems of philosophy ,
during his mature period he was still capable of writing :

.. .I used the name 'ontology'19 to characterize the theory I was
developing, without offense to my 'linguistic instincts' because I
was formulating in that theory a certain kind of 'general
principles of existence' .9

9

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T . Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I.
Barnett , Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 , p. 374 .

7

Chapter II - Towards An Understanding OfNominalism
Introduction
This Chapter is intended to build a very general background against
which Lesniewski's nominalism can be analyzed.
Eberle, who characterizes Lesniewski as a contemporary nominalist,
lists eight features of contemporary nominal.ism.
Although it is difficult to discover views common to all
contemporary nominalists , the following appear to be
widespread: (1) criticism of the notion of a class , in as much as a
class differs from the individual whole composed ofits elements,
(2) a refusal to postulate the existence of an infinity of objects,
(3) an aversion to treat predicates as expressions which
designate non -individuals, (4) objections to the use of such
entities as concepts, meanings, senses, and propositions in the
theory of meaning, (5) preference for a syntax where expressions
are construed as non-repeatable inscriptions , (6) efforts to
reconstruct or reinterpret portions of mathematics in such a
fashion that reference to numbers or classes is replaced by
reference to concrete objects, individual inscriptions, or wholes
which are determined by their least parts, (7) advocacy of
parsimony with regard to the number of distinct categories of
entities to which a theory makes reference, even at the expense
of greater complexity in the construction of definitions and
proofs, (8) a tendencyto identify individuals, if possible, with
phenomenal data or with observable macroscopic things or
events. Concrete things are preferred to abstract items, actual
entities to possible ones, occurrent qualities to dispositional ones ,
and observables to theoretical constructs. 10
The characteristics Eberle chose to highlight are, coincidentally, those
features of Lesniewski's logical systems which are most often cited as proof of
his, Lesniewski's, nominalistic inclinations. Yet, although these
characterizations accurately "define" those nominalistic features, they neither
describe the origins of Lesniewski's nominalism nor do they define the scope of
Lesniewski's philosophical nominal.ism.

10

Rolf A. Eberle , Nominalistic Systems, Dordrecht -Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
Company , 1970, p . 8.

8

It is necessary, therefore, to develop a rough understanding of
nominalism within the context of the realist/conceptualist/nominalist

debate

over the existence of universals. Aristotle's Theory of Universals will be
summarized and will be contrasted with Lesniewski's own limited notion of
universals. And, finally, several points in the nominalist/realist contention over
the existence of universals will be used to form a limited critical framework
against which Lesniewski's nominalistic philosophy can be judged.
1) A Definition OfNominalism
Nominalism is sometimes defined as "the doctrine that whatever exists
is a particular, and nothing but a particular."

11

Nominalism can also be defined

negatively, if 11••• by nominalism we mean the view that universals do not
exist. "12 These definitions do not help to explain what the nominalist takes to
be a particular, a universal or what he means for something to exist. But, in a
general way, one can understand from this that the nominalist wants to claim
that the world is made of only one kind of thing, namely, particulars, that we
can know these things, and that there are no other things, especially things
called universals.
Lesniewski, as·we will see in the next Chapter, Chapter III, never
expressed his nominalism as a developed philosophical doctrine. As a matter of
fact, once Lesniewski believed that he could construct logical systems that
might provide a consistent foundation for mathematics free of the possibility of
contradiction, he lost all interest in the traditional problems of philosophy. He
constructed logical systems that only allow consistent "talk" about objects and
he believed that he had "proven" that a certain, limited, kind of universal did

11 D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism and Realism, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press, 1978, p. 138.
12 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Oxford, New York: Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430. ·

9

not exist, but he did not engage in the debate over the existence of universals.
For that reason, it is necessary to provide a background against which we
might capture Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs and from which a clearer
sense of Lesniewski's nominalism can be defined.
The realist/conceptualist/nominalist

debate over the existence of

universals and an example of a realistic notion of universals will provide such a
background, since nominalism makes no sense outside of that debate and since
that debate makes no sense apart from what it means for a universal to exist.
The background I will provide makes no claim to completeness, it is purposely
constructed to highlight Lesniewski's philosophical beliefs.
It is, perhaps, best to begin our effort to provide a background for an
understanding of nominalism from the common origins of realism,
conceptualism and nominalism . These philosophical doctrines find their roots
in the beliefs of common sense realism. A common sense realist believes that
things like houses, trees, and people, things which we sense, i.e. particular
things or natural objects, actually exist in the world. He believes that we can
use ordinary language to talk about the things that exist, to talk about our
knowledge of what exists, and to talk about the correspondence between the
two. The realist, the conceptualist, and the nominalist, then, attempt to give
accounts of the same "world." They differ in that the realist emphasizes the
correspondence between objects which actually exist in the world and our inner
knowledge of those objects; the conceptualist emphasizes our inner knowledge
of objects; and the nominalist emphasizes the outer world of objects.
It has been suggested that the roots of nominalism lie in the Medieval
controversy over the "existence" of universals.
Medieval Realists .. .held that universals are real entities
subsisting independent of mind and sense. Medieval
Conceptualists .. .maintained that universals are real but mind-

10

dependent entities whose existence in the understanding may,
however, be due to similarities among objects. Medieval
Nominalists .. .advocated that only particular things exist. Thus,
members of a species were thought to have nothing in common,
except possibly the name of the species which refers to each
individual of the species.13
Since, as we will find, Lesniewski rejects epistemology and he did not
concern himself with the inner existence of objects, it is safe to eliminate
further consideration of conceptualism. Even if Lesniewski believed that
universals exist in mind, we will see that he rejects the realist belief that
universals somehow exist in the world. For that reason, I will focus my
considerations below on the realist/nominalist

debate over the existence of

universals.

It is clear that in order to understand nominalism, we need to know what
universals are for a realist in order to understand why a nominalist might
reject them.
2) Aristotle vs. Lesniewski
Aristotle's account of natural objects 14 includes a description of
universals. My discussion of Aristotle's Theory of Universals, therefore , will be
limited to a discussion of how Aristotle might answer the following two
questions:
What is a natural object?
How do we know a natural object?
Although Aristotle believed that philosophy begins and ends with an
account of the common sense world - "In general ... philosophy seeks the cause
of perceptible things ... 1115-, he also believed that a philosopher must extend
13 Rolf A. Eberle, Nominalistic

Systems, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1970, p. 4.
14 This section contains an abbreviated interpretation of Aristotle 's treatment of universals
and particulars. Appendix A contains a more complete treatment.
15 Aristotle, The Complete Works Of Aristotle, 2 Volumes, Ed. Jonathan Barnes , Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 1568 .

11

beyond what is merely sensed in order to provide a true account of natural
objects .
... while ... thinkers were inquiring into the truth of that which is,
they thought that which is was identical with the sensible world;
in this, however, there is largely present the nature of the
indeterminate ... and, therefore, while they speak plausibly, they
do not say what is true. 16
Although it is true that Aristotle uses the word "substance" in different
ways, I believe that for Aristotle a natural object, a particular thing, is a
combination of two "substances", that is a combination of matter and form,
neither of which exist separately. He also believed that we "know" these
"substances" in two distinct ways. Matter causes sensation; form causes
knowledge. Form, for Aristotle, is "what is truly universal in a particular."
Matter is that persistent substance which, along with form, combine to form a
particular thing.
Although matter and form are what we sense and what we know directly
and although we can "see" evidence of the existence of these "substances" in
the sensible world - that there can be both a bronze sphere (form) and a bronze
circle (form), i.e. two different forms made of identical matter, and that there
can be a bronze and a wooden sphere, i.e. two identical forms made of different
matter - matter and form are, in a sense, posited as substances necessary to
give a more complete account of change. Although I will not treat Aristotle's
account of motion, Aristotle believed that motion caused matter to "flow" from
one form to another.
"The form is a kind of power in matter - a duct as it were." 17
It is almost as if motion were a general force, moving matter from one form
into another.
l6 Ibid., p. 1594.
17 Ibid., p. 527.

12

What can be a bit confusing about Aristotle's account of universals, is,
that while form is 'truly what is universal in a particular' and form is a
"substance" we know directly in a different way from matter, the word
"universal" is most frequently used to refer to the accumulation of experiences
of the same form in the mind. In any case, when one knows form, 'what is
universal in a particular,' one actually knows a universal. The more we
experience the same form , however, the more aware of the universal we
become. This accumulation is neither a different sort of knowledge nor is it
knowledge of a different sort of thing than knowledge of 'what is universal in a
particular.'
For Aristotle, ifwe reject the existence of universals , we reject not only a
thing that exists differently than matter , but also the immediate object of our
knowledge.
Returning to the questions raised above:
What is a natural object?
How do we know a natural object?
Aristotle finds it necessary to answer both questions simultaneously.
He seems to feel that any discussion about "what is" necessarily requires a
discussion of "how we know what is. 11 He developed his theory of universals, in
part, as an epistemological counterpart to his ontological belief that
particulars, natural objects, actually exist in the world. If he had not, he would
have been confronted by two problems: what there is, is not, simply because
we know it AND what we know must be a different sort of thing than what is,
otherwise existence, in a sense, would be contingent on our knowledge. In final
analysis, universals are required in order to say how we know what is, since
what is seems to be always changing. A particular thing, a natural object, is
both form and matter . Our knowledge of form, then, provides us our knowledge
13

of what is similar in particulars and gives us the means to group natural
objects according to their similarities. General names, then, actually denote
universal substance, i.e. form.
How does Lesniewski's notion of universal fair against Aristotle's? In his
earlier works Lesniewski believed that his definition of "general object" was
sufficiently broad to encompass several kinds of universals.
'General objects', according to the various authors dealing with
them, possess a single characteristic property and that
irrespective of particular forms assumed by those objects in the
different systems in which they exist either as e.g.: 'notions' in
the sense of ancient and medieval 'realism', or Locke's 'general
ideas', or Twardowski's 'objects of general representations', or
Husserl's 'ideal' objects existing 'outside time'. 18
Even though Lesniewski later eliminates his references to other
philosophers, he retains the same definition of"general object," i.e. "general
objects" are objects which "possess a single characteristic property ... that the
object which is allegedly 'general' with respect to a group of'individual' objects
can possess only those properties which are common to all corresponding
'individual' objects."19
Even though Lesniewski's notion of "general objects" and his "proofs"
against the existence of universals will be more thoroughly discussed in
Chapter III, it is important to note here that he did not comment on other
notions of universals which might have provided justification for his own
restricted notion of what he defined as universals, i.e. "general objects".
Neither his definition of"general objects" nor his "proofs" against the existence
of"general objects", thrust Lesniewski into the realist/nominalist debate over
the existence of universals.
18 Stanislaw

Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle",
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I.
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992, p. 51.
19 Ibid., p. 51.

14

Aristotle's Theory of Universals was meant to provide an
epistemological and ontological basis for a discussion of change in natural
objects.
Lesniewski's logical systems are said to be ontologically neutral.
So his [Lesniewski's logical - my note] systems are logically pure
and metaphysically neutral in that they do not logically
presuppose or imply what is the population of the universe or the
denotation of expressions ...~
As true as this characterization might be, Lesniewski does mention the

existence of natural objects in his published works. It is obvious that
Lesniewski would not deny the existence of quite ordinary things. One must
realize , however, that Lesniewski occupied himself almost completely with the
construction of a language, his logical systems, which might provide a
consistent language for science and a consistent basis for mathematics;

he

avoided metaphysical discussion and rejected the usefulness of epistemology.
3) Realism vs. Nominalism
My intent is not to argue for or against the nominalist or realist point of
view, but, in this section, to provide a critical framework in which to highlight
the differences between nominalistic and realistic view of the world and,
therefore, to highlight the fact that certain features ofLesniewski's logical
,...ystems are nominalistic.
D. M.-Armstrong presents a critique of nominalism in his book
11

N ominalism and Realism. 11 He presents the nominalist/realist

controversy as

follows:
Nominalists deny that there is any genuine or objective identity
in things which are not identical. Realists, on the other hand,
hold that the apparent situation is the real situation. There
genuinely is, or can be, something identical in things which are
20 Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, Amsterdam:

Publishing

Company , 1962, p . 108.
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not identical. Besides particulars, there are universals.

21

For Armstrong an account of our knowledge of natural objects
necessarily includes the existence of universals. The fact that we can
simultaneously know things as individuals and as identical in certain respects
requires the existence of something in addition to the particular. Because of
that, Armstrong notes, even though
that exist are only particulars,

1122

11
•••

all Nominalists agree that all things

at some point in their account of natural

objects, in their effort to reduce the 11apparent identity in things which are not
identical, 11 they inevitably must appeal to properties, that is to universals.
All that the Nominalist can hope to do is to give a reductive
analysis or account of what it is for something to have a property
or to be of a certain kind or sort: a reductive analysis or account
of types. 23
And,

If, then, in the course of an attempted N ominalist analysis it
should happen that covert appeal is made to the notion of
property, kind or type, the analysis has failed to achieve its
purpose. 24
In his account of different kinds of nominalism (predicate nominalism, concept
nominalism, class nominal.ism, mereological nominal.ism, resemblance
nominalism, Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism), he shows that each
attempt fails to explain away similarities in things because it must, in the end,
either appeal to properties, that is universals, or, in the case of Ostrich or
Cloak-and-dagger N ominalism, simply ignore the II apparent identity in things
which are not identical."
In his general critique of nominalism, Armstrong concludes:
Ordinary thought and discourse recognizes identity both of
particulars and property, sort, or kind. Indeed, without the
21 D. M. Armstrong, Nominalism

and Realism, Cambridge, England:

Press, 1978, p. 12.
22 Ibid., p. 12.
23 Ibid., p. 19
24 Ibid., p. 19.
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distinction between sameness of thing and sameness of property
or kind, thought and discourse would be impossible. 25
For Armstrong, then, in order to be successful, a nominalist must be able to
explain the sameness of things without appealing to properties.
D. F. Pears critiques both realism and nominalism. He believes that
both nominalism and realism fail for the same reason.
Their (realism/nominalism- my note) goal is the unattainable
completely satisfactory explanation of naming.~
He criticizes realism in the following way:
But ultimately there must be some exit from the maze of words, and ,
wherever this exit is made, it will be impossible to give an informative
reason except by pointing. For the only other way of giving an
informative reason is to give a new word, and this would prevent the exit
from the maze of words from being made at this place 7. Still at the place
where the exit is made it is always possible to give a detailed reason like
'We are able to call things red because they are red', which is too
obviously circular even to look informative. Or alternatively it is
possible to say 'We are able to call things <j>because they are <j>',and this
is a general reason which is almost as obviously circular and
uninformative. What philosophers who propose the existence of
universals do is to propose a general reason which looks informative
because it shifts to another level, but unfortunately is not. Z7
He offers a similar criticism ofnominalism:
The type of nominalism which says that a name is applied to a
number of things which are similar immediately falls into the
same circularity.28
Because this
...similarity can be specified only by a backward reference to the
name. 29

25 Ibid., p. 19.

26 D . F. Pears, "Universals ", Universals And Particulars: Readings In Ontology, Editor
Michael Loux, Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1970, p. 48.
27 Ibid., p. 38.
28 Ibid., p. 41.
29 Ibid., p. 42 .
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Although Pears' article is critical of both nominalism and realism, at one
point he criticizes nominalism in a way that seems to support the realistic
assertion that universals serve an important function.
The type ofnominalism which suggests that things which are
called by one name have only their name in common represent
the extreme of artificiality. 21 It suggests that there
are never any ways of telling even approximately whether a
word is used in one sense or two senses [i.e. that there is a
reason one can call two things by the same name - my note]. 30

In another place, where he is critical of both nominalism and realism, he
actually seems to support the nominalist1s assertion that only particulars
exist, only the natural objects of common sense realism, by claiming that
naming is justified by pointing to a particular thing or a collection of particular
things.

If a word is explained ostensively, then however difficult this
process may be it really is explained ostensively. It is no good
trying to combine the concreteness of ostensive definition with
the clarityofverbal definition. Verbal definitions have such an
easy task just because ostensive definitions have such a difficult
task. 31

In the following Chapters, it will become clear that Lesniewski
constructed his logical systems in such a way as to avoid Pears' particular
criticism ofnominalistic languages. Lesniewski does not have to resort to
properties to be able to 11talk 11 about collections. In Lesniewski's logical
systems, naming is analogous to pointing to a particular thing or a collection of
things.
4) Remarks

In the next Chapter, Chapter III, I will explore Lesniewski s nominalism
1

and also discuss his notion of universals. Both Armstrong's and Pears' critique
should provide a loose background against which Lesniewski's own notions can
3o Ibid., p. 47.
31 Ibid., p. 48.
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be measured. If Armstrong is correct, Lesniewski can not be a successful
nominalist ifhe appeals to properties in his account of natural objects or if
properties are necessary for the success of his logical systems. Pears' critique
is pertinent because Lesniewski, I believe, will be able to overcome his
criticism of nominalist language in a way Pears has not considered. At this
point, however, we must begin to investigate the origins ofLesniewski's
rejection of universals.

19

Chapter III- Lesniewski's Nominalism
1) The Origins OfLesniewski's Nominalism
The first evidence ofLesniewski's nominalism, his belief that universals
do not exist, can be traced to the time when he first became interested in
modern symbolic logic (1910) and, more specifically, when (1911) he first
became familiar with Russell's Paradox ("class of all classes not members of
(subordinate to) themselves"). Underlying his earlier and his transitional
works was an intense, long -term, study (1911-1922) of Russell's Paradox and
similar antinomies.
While publishing in turn the above works [His earlier works;
seven papers written during the period (1911-1914) - my note], I
occupied myself zealously with the 'antinomies'. From the time
when in the year 1911 I began an acquaintance with them by
meeting with the 'antinomies' of Russell related to the 'class
[klasy] of classes not elements of themselves', and problems
concerning the antinomies were the most demanding subject of
my deliberations for over eleven years. 32
2) Russell's Paradox and Lesniewski's "Solution"

In Principia Mathematica3 3 Whitehead and Russell determined that, if a
class were considered the same sort of thing as one of its members, a paradox
would result. The paradox, "Russell's Paradox" results when we consider
whether or not "K," "a class of classes not subordinated to themselves," is
subordinated to itself. Lesniewski presents the Paradox quite clearly; I follow
his presentation below.

In order to understand the way in which the Russell's Paradox arises,
one must make two distinctions.

First, a distinction must be made between a

"full class" and an "empty class." A full class, the class of all men, for example,
32 Stanislaw

Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics, Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D . I .
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 199.
33 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. 1,
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1950, pp. 24, 37, and 60 - 65.

20

contains some individuals; an empty class, the class of all square circles, for
example, contains no individuals. Secondly, one must make a distinction
between classes that are and classes that are not subordinated to themselves.
A class not subordinated to itself, the 11class ofmen 11 for example, is not a man,
while a class subordinated to itself, the class of names, for example, is a name
or, to use Lesniewski's example, "the class of full classes 11 is also a full class
and, therefore, it is subordinated to itself.
With these distinctions made, we are then prepared to ask our question:
Is "K," "a class of classes not subordinated to themselves," subordinated to
itself or not?
If we accept that class K is subordinated to itself, then because
each class subordinated to the class K is not subordinated to
itself, we reach the conclusion that class K is not subordinated to
itself. Therefore a contradiction arises, for from this, that class
K is subordinated to itself, it results that K is not subordinated to
itself.
If we wish to avoid this contradiction, we must accept that class
K is not subordinated to itself. However, if it is not subordinated
to itself, then it belongs to class K, consequently it is
subordinated to itself. And so here also there arises a
contradiction, since from the fact that class K is not subordinated
to itself, it results that it is subordinated to itself. Whichever way
we turn we encounter a contradiction. 34

In short, Russell's Paradox results when a class is simultaneously
treated as the same sort of thing as its members .
... the appearance of contradiction is produced by the presence of some
word which has systematic ambiguity of type, such as ... class ...35
Whitehead and Russell believed that a class is not one of its members.3
They were not prepared to claim that a class actually exists. 37 Instead,
34 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics, Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I . Barnett, Trans . D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 201.

35 Alfred

North Whitehead

Cambridge, England:
36 Ibid., p. 24 .
37 Ibid., p. 72 .

and Bertrand

Russell, Principia Mathematica,

Cambridge University Press, 1950, p . 64.
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Whitehead and Russell introduce class into their logical system as an
"incomplete symbol":
The symbols for classes ... are incomplete symbols: their uses are
defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean anything at
all.38

... classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or
linguistic conveniences, not genuine objects as their members are if they
are individuals. 39
Although Whitehead and Russell did not believe that a class really
exists, they admit that they can neither prove that it exists nor prove that it
does not exist. Their own belief that classes do not exist is based on arguments
from "... the ancient problem of the One and the Many'. "40
Briefly, the arguments reduce to the following: If there is such an
object as a class, it must be in some sense one object. Yet it is only of
classes that many can be predicated. Hence, ifwe admit classes as
objects, we must suppose that the same object can be both one and
many, which seems impossible. 41

In the quotation below Lesniewski quoted and criticized Whitehead and
Russell's reason for believing that classes do not exist. Figure 1, below, is
referenced in his comments.

C

D

Figure 1.
Despite my sincerest wish, I am unable to treat seriously the thesis
which proclaims that, "ifwe admit classes as objects, we must suppose
that the same object can be both one and many which seems
impossible", as I feel in it some gross misunderstanding: evenposito
that the expression 'many' causes no doubts on the theme 'at least how
many?', I can find no sense in saying about some object that it is 'many'
even though, by assuming that the meaning of the expression 'many' is
not uncertain with respect to quantity, that it means e.g., the same as
'at least two', I fully understand e.g., the utterance that 'many objects'
38 Ibid., p.
39 Ibid., p.
40 Ibid., p.
41 Ibid., p.

71.

72.
72.
72, fn. *.
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exist in the world, or even the utterance that segment AB of Fig. 1 has
'many' parts. Seeing no sense in the thesis quoted, I cannot regard it as
an even slightly 'cogent' argument for anything at all in the world. 42
Because Whitehead and Russell can give no reason to reject or accept
their notion of class, Lesniewski simply dismissed that notion.
Scenting in the 'classes' of Whitehead and Russell and in the
'extensions of concepts' ofFrege, the aroma of mythical
specimens from a rich gallery of 'invented' objects, I am unable
to rid myself of an inclination to sympathize 'on credit' with the
authors' doubts as to whether objects which are such 'classes', do
exist in the world. 43
Even though Whitehead and Russell did not resolve the issue of the
existence of classes, they embedded their notion of class in their logical system
and proposed a Theory of Types to rid that system of "Russell's Paradox". 44
Lesniewski was dissatisfied with Whitehead and Russell's notion of class
because it left open the possibility that a class existed as a different sort of
thing than its members.
Lesniewski, on the other hand, developed Ontology and Mereology in
such a way that Russell's Paradox could not appear in his logical systems
because he "defined" a class as an object which, ifit existed, exists as a
collection of objects of the same type.
3) Lesniewski's View Of Classes
Lesniewski' realized that we can talk about "class" in two ways and, in
order to eliminate the possibility of "Russell's Paradox" from his logical
systems, he realized that he needed to include both ways of talking about
"class" in the construction of his logical systems. In the distributive sense,
42 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations

Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 225 and
226.
43

Ibid ., pp. 224 and 225.

44 Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica,

Cambridge, England:

Cambridge University Press, 1950, p. 60.
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"class" can be used in phrases like "a is a member of class P. In the collective
sense, class can also be used in phrases like "Pis a class of a's.
11

11

11

In Ontology, Lesniewski was able to eliminate the distributive use of
11

11

11

class by reducing a is a member of class P to a is P or to "a is one of the

11

11

11

P's, since the Axiom of Ontology specifies that both a andP are the same sort
11

ofthing .
...expressions of the form 'N is a member of the class cs', for
instance, may be regarded simply as long-winded ways of saying
'N is a c' or 'N is one of the cs'.45
...a Lesniewskian sentence of the form 'a£ b' is true just in case
the term 'a' is (semantically) singular, and the individual it
denotes is one of the one or more individuals denoted by 'b '. I
suggest that the ordinary language expression coming closest to
expressing this is 'a is one of b ': we think of examples such as
'Romeo is one of the Montagues', 'John Williams is one of Sky',
and so on.46
· Through the Axiom of Ontology Lesniewski was able to specify that both
11

11

11

11

11

11

a and P must be the same kinds of things. Since class is removed from
11

11

Ontology, the possibility of contradiction from the use of class in Ontology is
eliminated.

In the axioms and definitions of Mereology, Lesniewski was able to
11

11

specify that a collective class is a collection of things and nothing more. If we
ask what a class is in Mereology, it is a collection and that is all. In order to
demonstrate this, we must examine the first two axioms and the first two
definitions ofMereology.
AI.

[P ,Q]:PEcz(Q).:::).QEN(cz(P)).

47

45 Peter M. Simons, "On Understanding Lesniewski", History And Philosophy Of Logic.
Volume 3 , 1982, p. 188.
46 Ibid., p . 184.
47 Srzednicki, Jan T.J. and Stachniak, Zbigniew, Ed., Lesniewski's Lecture Notes in Logic,
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1988 , p. 60.

All.

[P ,Q,R]:Ptcz( Q).Qtcz(R).::J.Ptcz(R). 48

D.I.

[P,Q]:.Ptel(Q).=:P=Q.v.Ptcz(Q)49

D.11. [P ,a]::PtIG.(a).=:.Prnbj:.[Q]:Qta.::J.Qtel(P):.
[Q]:Qtel(P).::J.[3R, S] .Rtel( Q).Sta. Rtel(S). 50
Before a detailed look at Lesniewski's "collective" class, "Kl(a)" in D. II
above, I would like to make three observations. First, the most basic element
of Mereology is something which is designated a part, i.e. "cz", of something
else. So, whoever would use Mereology to talk about the world, must first
specify what is to be taken as a part. From this it must be recognized that, if
anything can be "built" in Mereology", it must be built of parts. Second, a class
and its members are defined as the same sort of thing and, ultimately, they
must be specified in terms of things, i.e. part(s), which are in the world. Thirdly,
"Kl" is not an object in D.II .. "Kl" specifies how objects "a" are to be collected.
Let us now look closely at D. II and determine exactly what "P is a class
of a's", i.e. 11PtKl(a) 11, means. "PtKl(a)" is "defined" by the three conjuncts
which follow the equivalence sign. "Prnbj, 11 the first conjunct, specifies that 11P 11
in "PtKl(a)" must be an object. The second conjunct, "[Q]:Qta.::J.Qtel(P),11

determines the relationship between the object "P" and the object(s) "a" in
"PtKl(a)" and can be translated into the English sentence: "If any thing is an
'a,' then that thing is 'P' or is one of the parts of 'P' .11 The third, the last
conjunct, [Q]:Qrnl(P).::J.[3R,S].Rtel(Q).Sta.Rtel(S), specifies that, "if any Q is
one of the elements of P" or, another way of saying the same thing, "if any Q is
P or is a part of P", "then" three conditions must be met. First, "there is some
thing R which is Q or a part ofQ. 11 Second , "there is some thing S which is one
of the a 's." And, lastly, "the thing which is Q or part of Q, i.e. R, is the same
48

Ibid. , p. 60.

4 9 Ibid. , p. 60.
5 o Ibid., p. 60.
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thing as the thing S (which is one of the a's) or is a part of that thing S (which is
one of the a's)." In short, "PiJG(a)" could be read "Pis the collection of a's" or

'

as Lesniewski suggests, "PEIG(a)"could also be read "Pis the' ... heap of objects
a consisting of every a .'51."

Lesniewski believed in a quite concrete notion of class and, therefore,
could reject a Theory of Types.
Expressions of the type 'class of objects a' are, on the basis of
my mereology, names denoting definite and quite ordinary
objects. These expressions naturally have nothing in common
either with any mythology of 'classes', considered as objects of
some 'higher type' or 'higher order', or with a use of the word
'class' in which the latter is not the name of any object(s) , but
rather a surrogate {aeon de parler of some entirely different
syntactical type , as for example the system of Whitehead and
Russell. The totality of theorems of my system of the
foundations of mathematics, which in practice can be handled as
theoretical correlates of this or that thesis of these authors'
'theory of classes', forms a proper part ofmy ontology.s2
In addition to his "definition" of class in Mereology, Lesniewski offered his

objections to certain kinds of classes which were excluded from that logical
system. Lesniewski did not accept the existence of empty classes which , if
accepted , would necessarily have to exist apart from their members because
an empty class has no members.
Being of the opinion that, if an object is the class of some a (e.g.,
people, points, square circles), then it actually consists of a, I
always rejected, in accordance with thesis (1) on page 186, the
existence of theoretical monstrosities like the class of square
circles , understanding only too well that nothing can consist of
something which does not even exist. There has never been a
time in my life in which I would not have been in complete
agreement with the lapidary remark of Frege apropos the
Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands : Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992 , p . 225.
52 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article:
Stanislaw Lesniewski
'Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik
Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans. W.
Teichmann and S. McCall , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1992 , pp. 709 - 710.
5l
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theory of classes of Ernest Schroeder: "If' ... 11a class consists of
objects, is an aggregate, a collective unity of them, then it must
vanish when the objects vanish. Ifwe burn all the trees in a
forest, we thereby burn the forest. Thus there can be no empty
class." 53
Lesniewski did not believe that a class of just one object existed. A
natural object, for example, may be considered a single thing, and, therefore , "is
a class, whose only element is just that object, 11 but Lesniewski insisted that
even that object might contain elements (refer to Figure 1. repeated below).

D

... I firmly reject ... the view according to which (E*) every object
is a class, whose only element is just that object, because ,
considering e.g., segment AB of Fig. I and taking into account the
circumstance that, from the point of view of my conception of
classes (see thesis (17, Chapter II), segment AC is an element of
segment AB which is in accordance with thesis (13) the class of
the segments which are segment AC or segment CB, I am, of
course, entitled to assert that although one and only one object
is segment AB ofFig. 1, and although such being the case, in
accordance with thesis (3) segment AB is also the class of
segments AB, that segment is by no means the class whose only
element is just that segment AB.54
At the same time that Lesniewski eliminated the ambiguous notion of
class from his logical systems, I believe that he saw a similarity between the
ambiguous notion of class and the notion of a "general" object, objects which
Lesniewski believed were universa ls and which he thought were ambiguous as
well. Lesniewski , therefore, believed that he could eliminate the ambiguous
notion of universals just as he had eliminated the ambiguous notion of class. If
53 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations

Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works , Eds. Stanislaw J . Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I.
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 214 and
215.
54 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Swma , Jan T . Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 216.
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his notion of class as a collection of objects and nothing more, eliminated
"Russell's Paradox" and Whitehead and Russell's Theory of types, he believed
that "general" objects, universals, could be analogously eliminated by showing
that universals could not exist apart from the individuals whose common
property they were supposed to possess and, therefore, that they did not exist.
4) Lesniewski's Two "Proofs" That "General" Objects Do Not Exist.
Lesniewski offered two "proofs" against the existence of "general"
objects. His first "proof' 55 appeared in 1913 in an article titled "The Critique of
the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle" 56 and is the only part of any earlier
work not later repudiate. Tadeusz Kotarbinski includes a version of
Lesniewski's first "proof," along with similar proofs of his own and others, in his
book titled "Gnosiology" which was published in 1929.57
Lesniewski's second "proof' 58 appeared during his "mature" period in
1927 in the footnote 59 of an article titled "On Russell's 'Antinomy' Concerning
'The Class of Classes Which Are Not Elements ofThemselves'."

60

This article

was the second of a series of papers collectively titled "On the Foundations of
Mathematics." These papers were published between 1927 and 1931. Eugene
Luschei includes a version ofLesniewski's second proof in his book "The Logical

55 The wording of Lesniewski's First Proof is included as Appendix B.
56 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle",

Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I.
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1992, pp. 51 through 53.
5? Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York:
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 36, (please see footnote 5).
58 The wording of Lesniewski's Second Proof is included as Appendix C.
59 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 198. The
proof, interestingly enough, appears where Lesniewski actually repudiates all that he wrote
during his 'initial period'.
60 Ibid.,pp. 198 and 199, fn. 6.
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published in 1962.61 Kotarbinski also gives a

summary of "the essential point" of both "proofs "62 and hints that Lesniewski
believed that both "proofs" were essentially the same. 63
There are similarities between both "proofs." In both "proofs" "general"
objects are defined in the same way: they "possess a single characteristic
property ... that the object which is allegedly 'general' with respect to a group of
'individual' objects can possess only those properties which are common to all
corresponding 'individual' objects."64 Both "proofs" have the same form; they
are both reductio ad absurdum "proofs."
There are also differences between the first and the second "proof." In
the second "proof':
1. Lesniewski withdrew his comparison between his notion of a

"general" object and different authors, e.g. Locke's, Twardowski's and Husserl's,
notion of "universal" objects, that is, he eliminated his desire to 11ascribe this or
that opinion on the question of 'general object' to the authors mentioned" in his
first 11proof. 11
I regard my treatment as the result of careful formulation of
theoretical tendencies involved, more or less explicitly, in the
argumentation of opponents of the different kinds of 'universals'
in various phases of their 'disputes' about them. If one takes the
position that this assertion is a banal one, I would cite in defense
the circumstance that exponents of 'philosophy' defend,

61

Eugene C. Luschei, The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1962, footnote 21, pp. 308 through 310.
62 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York:
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430. "An essential point in this borrowed proof was the
assumption that each object of a given set of objects has a specific property of its own, and
hence a universal can by definition neither have that property nor its negation, which runs
contrary to the law of excluded middle, and indirectly contrary to the law of contradiction. "
63 Ibid., p. 48, fn . 5 .
64 Stanislaw. Lesniewski , "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle ", Trans.
S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J.
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1991, p. 51.
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regrettably often, positions at variance with banal assertions.

615

2. In referring back to his first "proof," Lesniewski states that he no
longer believes in "features" (properties ) or "relations."
At the time I wrote that passage I believed that there are in
existence in this world so called features and so called relations,
as two special kinds of objects, and I felt no scruples about using
the expressions 'feature' and 'relations'. It is a long time since I
believed in the existence of objects which are features, or in the
existence of objects which are relations and now nothing induces
me to believe in the existence of such objects (see: Tadeusz
Kotarbinski, [1921], pp. 7-11)...66
3. Lesniewski did not provide examples of a "general" object in his
second "proof."
Even in his first "proof," Lesniewski did not ente r directly into the
nominalist/realist debate over the existence of universals; he , evidently ,
considered his "proof' sufficient evidence that things such as universals did not
exist.
'General objects' , according to the various authors dealing with
them , possess a single characteristic property and that
irrespective of particular forms assumed by those objects in the
different systems in which they exist either as e.g.: 'notions' in
the sense of ancient and medieval 'realism', or Locke's 'general
ideas', or Twardowski's 'objects of general representations', or
Husserl's 'ideal' objects existing 'outside time'. 67
Lesniewski believed that "general" objects encompassed what several
philosophers believed were universals. Lesniewski seems to believe that the
universals of realism are 'notions.' Is he confusing conceptualism with realism?
None the less he rejects all such things!

65

Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works , Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett , Trans . D. I.
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 199.
66 Ibid., p. 198.
6 7 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of Excluded Middle ",
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I.
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers , 1992 , p . 51.
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The fact that Lesniewski did not repudiate his first "proof' and actually
provides a second, mature, "proof' indicates that the nominalistic motivation
for the creation of his logical systems had not decreased, even though he
withdrew criticism of various specific notions of "general" objects (universals).
If Kotarbinski is correct, Lesniewski considered his second "proof' to be

essentially the same as his first and, therefore, an analysis of the first "proof'
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper.

In both "proofs" Lesniewski argued that "general" objects (which
"possess a single characteristic property ... that the ohject which is allegedly
'general' with respect to a group of 'individual' objects can possess only those
properties which are common to all corresponding 'individual' objects." 68) does
not exist. His first "proof' seems to work , ifwe believe that an object's
existence is contingent on having properties, i.e. that a thing must have a
property to be an object. By definition a "general" object can have only a
certain property. To paraphrase Kotarbinski, if there is no property for a
"general" object to possess, then a "general" object can not exist. And that is
the reasoning behind Lesniewski's "proof' which I outline below:
Lesniewski assumed that a "general" object, Pk, exists as defined above.
1)

Pk exists
a)

1. Every individual object, P'k, has a single property, e.g.

Ck, that makes it unique.
2. Ck is not common.
3. Pk, therefore, does not possess Ck.
b)

1. The individual object, P'k, possessing Ck, can not

possess not Ck. (Reason: P'k can possess Ck or not Ck, but not both)

68 Ibid., p. 51.
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2. "Not Ck" is not common. ("Not Ck" is not possessed at
least by P'k)
3. Pk, therefore, does not possess not Ck.
4. Pk, therefore, possesses Ck.
2)

Pk does not exist. (The assumption that a "general" object exists

leads to a contradiction, i.e. Pk possesses and does not possess Ck. Therefore ,
by reductio ad absurdum we are entitled to negate our assumption.)
Lesniewski's "proof' seems to work if we believe two things. First, we
must believe that a "general" oQject possesses properties in the same way as
individual objects, that is, an object's existence must be contingent on the fact
that it possesses properties.

Second, we must believe that there is a single

property that "makes" each individual individual. Also, I believe that Guido

Kung is correct in his observation that Lesniewski's "proof' fails because he,
Lesniewski, assumes that a 'general' object and an 'individual' object are the
same type of thing, that 'general' objects are to be" ... regarded to be exactly like
concrete objects."69 The problem with Lesniewski's "proof' is that, if the
existence of an object is contingent on possessing a unique property, then a
"general" object, by definition, could never exist because its "existence" is
contingent on possessing a common property. Lesniewski's "proof' plays on
the fact that "existence" and "possessing properties" are used equivocally and,
therefore, it fails. Unlike the success Lesniewski experienced in eliminating the
ambiguous notion of class from his logical systems, his "proof' that "general
objects," universals, do not exist fails because it uses "existence" and
"possessing properties" ambiguously.

69 Guido Kung, Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language, Dordrecht- Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing

Company, 1967, p . 104.

32

1

Additionally, Lesniewski s proof is not a fair representation of the kind of
thing a realist would call a universal. In the most general sense, if Pk were
taken to be a 11general 11 object in respect to 11all individuals being individual,

11

that is, Ckis the property of being an 11individual, 11 then no realist would claim
that Pk is an 11individual.

11

Just the reverse; the fact that Pk is not an

11

individual 11 object, could provide proof for a realist that Pk is a different sort of

thing, namely a 11general 11 object or a universal.

In 11Is All Truth Only True Eternally Or Is It Also True Without A
Beginning 11 Lesniewski writes about oQjects, properties, and the relation of
inherence. 70 In the case of an 11individual 11 object, Lesniewski believes that:
objects possess properties; properties inhere in objects; and, so, therefore,
properties relate to objects differently than objects relate to properties. Why
does Lesniewski deny that there might be a difference between the way in
which properties inhere in 11individual 11 objects and the way properties inhere in
11

general 11 objects? It seems that Lesniewski simply insists that only
individual 11 objects possess properties and properties, properly speaking, can

11

onlyinherein

11

individual 11 objects.

Lesniewski 1s second 11proof, 11 I believe, merely shows that things defined
similarly to 11general 11 objects cannot exist in his systems. And, from
Lesniewski's second "proof,11 it is clear that he no longer believed that he was
providing a 11proof 1 against any specific notion of a universal. Lesniewski's
second 11proof' demonstrates his continued belief that nominalistic logical
systems could best provide a sound basis for mathematics, but his comments
are evidence that he had abandoned discussion of traditional problems of

70 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is All Truth Only True Eternally or Is It Also True Without
Beginning ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works. Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett , Trans. S. J. Surma and J . Wojcik, Dordrecht , The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 89 .
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philosophy to include any part in the realist/nominalist debate over the
existence of universals.
5) Lesniewski's Shift In Philosophical Focus
During his 11mature 11 period (1916 - 1939), Lesniewski repudiated his
earlier, more philosophical works - except, of course, his first "proof' 'against
the existence of universals-; he abandoned work on the traditional problems of
philosophy; and he focused his efforts on the development of his logical
systems. This 11shift 11 in focus can be seen as early as 1916 when Lesniewski
published the "Foundations of the General TheoryofSets, 1171 a paper which
forms 11a bridge between Lesniewski 1s early and later writings. 1172 In that paper
Lesniewski formally announced the new direction of his thinking.
I wish to add a few words as a preventative measure against
possible critical objections from the 1philosophical 1camp: that is in my system the expressions are treated as a hypotheticaldeductive system, from which it follows that, properly speaking, I
assert only that those propositions which I call 1theorems result
from the propositions which I call 'axioms1. The psychic sources 1
of my axioms are my intuitions, which simply means, that I
believe in the truth of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I
believe, since I am not acquainted with the theory of causality.
My axioms do not have a logical 'source', which simply means
that these axioms do not have proofs within my system, just as
in general no axioms, in the nature of things, have proofs in that
system for which they are axioms. I am quite unable to answer
the question, what is the 'objective value 1ofmy axioms, nor any
other similar questions, which concern the exponents of the socalled theory of knowledge - because I admit sadly and to my
clear disadvantage, that despite my most sincere wishes, I am
still unable to understand even one of the problems which occur in the
just mentioned respectable science 1.73
1

1

1

71

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets", Stanislaw
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I.
Barnett, Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academinc Publishers,
1992 , pp. 131 and 132.
72 Stanislaw Lesniewski, Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed. Stanislaw J.
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academinc Publishers, 1992, p. ix.
73 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets ", Stanislaw
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol 1.), Ed . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, and D. I.
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By abandoning work on the traditional problems of philosophy,
Lesniewski never constructed a complete philosophical system. He distanced
himself from the "philosophical camp" - and focused almost completely on the
development of his logical systems. Sobocinski, a student of Lesniewski,
recalls that Lesniewski even avoided "philosophical 'asides 111 in published works.
There is an interesting contrast on this score between the two
great figures on the Warsaw School of Logic, Lukasiewicz and
Lesniewski. The latter was also a philosopher by training; he
too moved away from philosophy and avoided even philosophical
"asides" in his published work. 74
Lesniewski's philosophical tendencies, his formalism, his intuitionism,
his nominalism, his pragmatism, his common-sense, his penchant for
precision, all provided a loose background against which Lesniewski built his
logical systems. From Lesniewski's statement above, it appears that he not
only abandoned the traditional problems of philosophy, but he also found the
disciplines of philosophy, i.e. ontology and epistemology, irrelevant as well.
There is no evidence that his attitude toward philosophy or towards logic
changed after 1916. Lesniewski did, however, continue to believe that
"general" objects, universals, do not exist.
6) Remarks
After Lesniewski's "shift" in thinking, he abandoned work on the
traditional problems of philosophy. Yet, I believe, he maintained his belief that
objects exist in the world and universals do not. His belief in this regard can
hardly be called a philosophical doctrine . In Lesniewski's mature works there
is no discussion of traditional philosophical issues; his nominalistic inclinations
can only be inferred from certain metalogical statements about the

Barnett, Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academinc Publishers,
.
1992, pp. 130 and 131.
74 Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1989, p. 85.
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construction of his logical systems, from the fact that features of his logical
systems can be interpreted nominalistically, and from the few comments
others have made about his philosophical beliefs.
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Chapter N - Nominalistic Features OfLesniewski 1s Logical Systems.
Many authors

75

have noted that Lesniewsk:i 1s nominalism is evident in

the features of his logical systems. By considering together the various
aspects ofLesniewski's logical system, i.e. terminological explanations,
directives, the axioms and definitions of Protothetic, Ontology and Mereology ,
and the actual theses of Protothetic, Ontology and Mereology which Lesniewski
developed, Lesniewski 1s nominalistic tendencies are strongly evident. In these
1

features we can see how Lesniewski s commitment to things is expressed in his
logical systems.
Logical systems can be said to be nominalistic in two ways. 1. They
can be nominalistic in the way they are constructed. 2. They can be
nominalistic in the way they are used.
Lesniewski constructed his logical systems as if they were objects .
There are three aspects of the construction ofLesniewski 1s logical systems
1

which are relevant. I will examine Lesniewsk:i s notion of Equiformity, his
Terminological Explanations, and his Directives in the first section of this
chapter.
Logical systems are nominalistic in the way they are used, if their
variables can be replaced by the expressions of some actual language , actual
things , without the requirement that those expression denote and if, as will be
1

discussed below in the examination of Lesniewski s quantifiers, the author
chooses to interpret his quantifiers substitutionally.

I believe that

Lesniewski 1s notion of quantification meets those requirements.
1) Are Lesniewski 1s Logical Systems Nominalistic In Construction?
75 Examples of authors who discuss the nominalistic features of Lesniewski 's logical
systems are: Rolf Eberle in "Nominalistic Systems ", John T. Kearns in "The Contribution

of
Lesniewski ", Guido Kung in "Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language ", Eugene C.
Luschei in "The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski " and Peter M. Simons in "On Understanding
Lesniewski". Complete citations are given in the Bibliography.
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A) Equiformity and Terminological Explanations
Before Lesniewski introduced his directives, i.e. the rules ofinference, for
any of his logical systems , he introduced the ax:iom(s) of that system and,
through the terminological explanations , built up sufficient metalanguage to be
able to precisely define exactly how theses and definitions were to be
introduced, that is, just how his logical systems were to be constructed.
Lesniewski did not consider either the terminological explanations or the
directives parts of his logical systems .
. . .directives [and, therefore, Terminological Explanations - my
note] do not themselves belong to the system of Protothetic
[Ontology, Mereology- mynote ] which they affect ...76
They are parts ofhis overall logical enterprise , how~ver, and , as such , add
considerably to the nominalistic tone of his logical systems.
Consideration of the axiom of Protothetic and several of the
terminological explanations which apply to that axiom will be sufficient to
provide an understanding of the way in which terminological explanations are
nominalistic. Lesniewski chose Lukasiewicz's Axiom (L) not only as a basis for
protothetic but also as the object used in the development of his terminological
explanations for Protothetic. That Axiom is:
CC CaC() aCCCNyC6N tC CyC6tC Ct6Crt11C01177
Two examples of terminological explanations will be sufficient to show
that terminological explanations are independent statements about Axiom (L)
and the way Axiom (L) is to be regarded. It should be noted that these
76

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals Of A New System Of The Foundations Of
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works , Eds. Stanisla w J . Surma , Jan T.
Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers , 1992 , p. 468.
77 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On Definitions In The So-Called Theory Of Deduction ",
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works , Eds . Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I.
Barnett , Trans . E. C. Luschei, Dordrecht , The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers ,
1992 , p. 631.
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terminological explanations preserve the notion of collection which Lesniewski
developed in Mereology. My example of a terminological explanation will be
taken from Lesniewski's development of Protothetic.

Terminowgical explanation I. I say of object A that it is (the)
complex of (the) a8 if and only if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
(1) A is an expression;
(2) if any object is a word that belongs to A, then it belongs to a
certain a;
(3) if any object B is a, any object C is a, and some word that
belongs to B belongs to C, then B is the same object as C;
(4) if any object is a, then it is an expression that belongs to
A.978

In the first terminological explanation, Lesniewski is developing a way to

talk about Axiom (L) in terms of a complex of (the) a, i.e. as a collection of
words.
In the second terminological explanations, Lesniewski points to a word in

Axiom (L) in his explanation of what it is for one object to be the negate of
another.

Terminological explanation II. I say of object A that it is (the)
negate ofB if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) A is an expression;
(2) B is the complex of objects that are either A or the first of
the words that belong to B;
(3) Bis not a word;
(4) the first of the words that belong to B is an expression
equiform to the 11th word of Axiom (L).79
In this way, terminological explanation after terminological explanation,

Lesniewski develops and entire vocabulary surrounding Axiom (L) in advance
of introducing his directives.
Before proceeding to formulate the directives of this system
[protothetic - my note] of the theory of deduction based on Axiom
(L), I give the following series of terminological explanations of

78 Ibid. , p . 631.
79 Ibid., p . 633.
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the technical expressions peculiar to these directives. 80
Terminological Explanation II contains the word "equiform." Lesniewski
refers to "an expression equiform to the 11th word of Axiom (L)." Lesniewski
talks about equiformity in the following ways:
Every expression is equiform to itself. 81
Two expressions equiform to each other written in two different
places are never the same expression. (Not taking these facts
into consideration could lead the reader to a completely wrong
interpretation of my terminological explanations ...82
When Lesniewski talks about equiformity, he is really talking about
"seeing" similarities. It is true that Lesniewski wishes to emphasize the fact
that each expression is an individual , even though it is the same shape as
another expression. And, in order to do that, he has to appeal to their similar
shape, a property. This appeal to similarity of shape, however, is not a fatal
flaw in the construction ofLesniewski 's logical systems. Terminological
explanations refer to actual objects which exist, i.e. expressions, and, in order to
understanding thoes similarities, one does not need to appeal to a similarity of
shape.
B. Directives
Having provided a way to talk about Axiom (L), Lesniewski, then,
introduced the directives for substitution , detachment and definition and for the
use of quantifiers. Lesniewski believes that his directives save his logical
systems (Protothetic , Ontology and Mereology) from the possibility of
contradiction:
The directives represented above of the system Protothetic,
together with the directives of Ontology and Mereology which I
80 Ibid., p. 631.
81 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals
Of A New System Of The Foundations Of
Mathematics" , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P . O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers , 1992, p. 4 70.
82 Ibid. p. 471.
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shall deal with in further sections of this article, I consider, in all
due modesty, to be but one of the numerous attempts to
formalize mathematics which have been undertaken on a larger
scale by various investigators since the time ofFrege , and which
are represented today under the 'metamathematical' banner (as
it is best known) of David Hilbert. But even among those works
whose purpose is to construct a foundation for mathematics I do
not know of a single one which actually stipulates, in a way that
causes no doubts about its interpretation, a combination of
directives sufficient for the derivation of all the theses effectively
admitted into its system, and which at the same time would not
lead to a contradiction in one way or another not foreseen by its
author. 83
Once specified, the directives allow the rigorous construction of each of
Lesniewski's logical systems. Lesniewski viewed each "growing" logical system
as a definite thing, albeit a growing thing.
As theses of this system in addition to Axiom (L) I count only
those 'definitions' and 'theorems' effectively added to the system,
not various other expressions that might be added according to
its directives. So the extent of the expression 'thesis of this
system' is by no means univocally determined in advance, but
rather is conceived as 'growing' by stages. Axiom (L) is the only
expression already a thesis of this system .84
Lesniewski would never, it appears, talk about possible theses of his
logical systems. The exactness of his terminological explanations and
directives assured him that he was able to define precisely the growth of his
systems . In understanding the development ofLesniewski's logical systems as
objects, I cannot imagine a system oflogic more precise or more nominalistic in
construction. They are constructed by appealing only to objects.
2) Are Lesniewski's Logical Systems (Quantifiers) Used
Nominalistically?

83 Ibid., p. 488, fu. 86.
Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On Definitions in the So-Called Theory of Deduction", Stanislaw
Lesniewski Collected Works, (Vol. II.), Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I.
Barnett, Trans. E. C. Luschei, Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers
1992, p. 635, fu. 15.
'
84
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I will show that Lesniewski intended that actual expressions of any
language of the appropriate semantic category could be substituted for the
variables of his logical systems and, because of that , his notion of
quantification is substitutional and , therefore, nominalistic.
W. V. Quine believed that Lesniewski's quantifiers are to be interpreted
substitutionally and, therefore, are evidence of his nominal.ism.
Ruth Marcus construes quantification substitutionally, and so,
less explicitly , did Lesniewski: she for reasons having to do with
modal logic, he for reasons of nominalism. 85
We can explain universal quantification as true when true
under all substitutions; and correspondingly for existential.
Such is the course that has been favored by Lesniewski and by
Ruth Marcus . 86
Quin e's view of Lesniewskian quantification is based on conversations
he had with Lesniewski himself.

I cannot locate an adequate statement of Stanislaw Lesniewski's
philosophy of quantification in his writings; I have it from his
conversations. E. C. Luschei, in The Logical Systems of
Lesniewski (Amsterdam: North-Holland , 1962), pp. 108f,
confirms my attribution but still cites no passage.87
Lesniewski's logical systems are ontologically neutral; his "quantifiers
assert only the the existence of expressions."
Once constants of a specific semantical category are introduced into
the system, then quantified variables of this semantical category may
also be used, since Lesniewski's quantifiers assert only the existence of
expressions. 88

It may, therefore, seem contradictory to say that Lesniewski's notion of
quantification provides evidence of his nominalism and, at the same time, to

85 W. V. Quine , The Roots Of Reference. La Salle , Illinois: Open Court , 1973, p . 99.
86 Willard Van Orman Quine , Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969 , p. 63 .
87 Ibid ., p. 63 , footnote 15.
88 Kung, Guido, Ontology And The Logistic Analysis Of Language, Dordrecht - Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company , 1967,pp. 123 and 124.
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say that Lesniewski's logical systems are ontologically neutral. There is ,
however , no contradiction.
According to Quine, a nominalist, such as Lesniewski, chose
substitutional quantification to avoid r eference to 11••• indenumerable and
indefinite universes ... [which - my word] ...are what, in the end, give point to
objectual quantification and ontology. 1189 The fact that Lesniewski's logical
systems are ontologically neutral , that his quantifiers assert only the existence
of expressions, then, does not contradict the Quine's assertion that Lesniewski
chose substitutional quantification because of his nominalism.
Luschei agrees with Quine's interpretation ofLesniewski's quantifiers.
Quantification in languageL is an ontologically innocent, strictly
logical device for making generalizations, whose variables stand
for (i.e., in place of) arbitrary substituents, or substitutable
expressions of the same semantic category. 90
Quine describes two common II attitudes" toward quantifiers:
1) substitutionally conceived, the "variable is strictly a
place holder for the constants that can be substituted for it. Such
variables do not purport to refer to objects as values. The
constants that may be substituted for them need not be names
at all; they may belong to any grammatical category .1191
2) objectually (or referentially) conceived, "the variable refers to
objects of some sort as its values; and these need not even be
objects each of which is separately specifiable by name or
description. 1192
He also notes:
There are not really different interpretations of the quantifiers.
There are instead different views of variables - how one
understands a quantifier depends on the way he regards the
quantified variable. 93
89 W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays , New York and London: Columbia
University Press, 1969, p. 107.
9o Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski , Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Compan y, 1962 , p. 110.
9 1 Quine , W. V., The Roots Of Reference, La Salle , Illinois: Open Court, 1973 , p. 98.
92 Ibid. , p. 98.
93 John T. Kearns, "Two Views Of Variables ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic,
Volume X, Number 2, April 1969 , p. 167.
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Quine criticized the substitutional interpretation of quantifiers. Since he
believed that Lesniewski's notion of quantification was substitutional, his
criticism extended to Lesniewski's logical systems. Kung and Canty attempted
to defend Lesniewski from such criticism by writing an article titled
"Substitutional quantification and Lesniewski.an quantifiers" in which they
asserted that Lesniewski's notion of quantification was neither substitutional
nor referential, but rather something else.
The controversy over the interpretation of Lesniewski's quantifiers is
not yet resolved in the literature.

I believe, however, that one must make a

distinction between an interpretation of Lesniewski's quantifiers and
Lesniewski's own thoughts on quantification. In this thesis my emphasis is on
attempting to determine how Lesniewski viewed quantifiers in an effort to
understand his nominalism.
I will divide my treatment of Lesniewski.an quantification into two parts:
In Part I, I will answer three question about Lesniewski's notion of

quantification, in order to give our discussion a straightforward orientation:
1) What are quantifiers in Lesniewski's logical systems?

2) Are quantifiers "primitive" and in what sense are

quantifiers "primitive" in Lesniewski's logical systems?
3) What do quantifiers do in Lesniewski's logical systems?

In Part II, I will attempt to construct a consistent account of

quantification from the hints he has given us in his published works.
PART I
1) What are Lesniewski's quantifiers?
Lesniewski's Terminological Explanation VII, namely,
T.E. VIII [A]:: Ais qntf.=:.
lingr (A) is vrbl.
Uingr (A) is vrb 2:
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[3B]. B is int(A) :.
[B]: Bis int (A). :::J. Bis trm :.
[B,C] : Bis int(A). C is int(A). Bis cnf(C) .:::J.Bis Id(C) 94
"describes" "quantifier" in Lesniewski's logical systems. A quantifier,
according to this T .E., is a set of brackets , "[]," filled with one or more terms,
e.g. "[x]," "[x y]," etc.
There are, however, a series of quotations from various works of
Lesniewski that seem to indicate that he thought that quantifiers [one must
remember that Lesniewski officially used only the universal quantifier] were
just the brackets and not the terms contained within them .
. . .all or only some variables contained in the quantifier into the
quantifiers in front of the left ... 95
... universal quantifier containing variable function-signs ... 96
... quantifiers containing propositional variables .. .97
... universal quantifiers containing propositional variables ... 98
... the variables occurring in the quantifier ... 99 - which Lesniewski
precedes by an example similar to [a~ ... KA... ] (f(a~ ... KA.... )).
But there are also places where Lesniewski supports the "definition" of
quantifier we found in Terminological Explanation VII, for example:
... P and Q are any meaningful propositions in Protothetic
containing no variables dependent upon the quantifier .100
And I have to agree with Luschei when he writes:

94 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T.
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans . M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers , 1992, pp. 472 and 473.
95 Ibid., p. 442.
96 Ibid., p. 445.
97 Ibid., p. 448.
98 Ibid. , p. 457.
99 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation of My Article:
'Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik"', Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. W.
Teichmann and S. McCall , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers ,
1992, pp. 664 and 665.
mo Ibid., p . 463.
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"... A quantifier enclosing no term to bind variables would be useless ...

11101

I believe that we have given enough evidence to show what quantifiers
are in Lesniewski's systems; we have developed enough of an understanding to
be able to "point" to them , even though there might be the lingering suspicion
that, strictly speaking, the quantifier does, somehow, seem to be just a pair of
brackets
2) Are quantifiers primitive and in what way primitive?

Lesniewski thought that quantifiers were primitive.
The problem for which I present the solution is the following:
is it possible to construct a system of logistic recognizing the
equivalence sign as the only primitive term (in addition, of
course, to the quantifiers (3)?14 102
The primitive nature of the universal quantifier, Lesniewski "officially"
used only universal quantifiers, seems different than the way in which 11E , 11"=,"
and "part" (cz) are primitive terms for Lesniewski. "c," "=," and "part" (cz) are
"defined," so to speak, in the way they are used in the axiom in which each first
appears. The Primitive nature of universal quantifiers seems to demand,
however, that we "see" some connection between an inscription within the
quantifier bracket and the inscription (s) in other parts of an axiom or thesis
which are equiform with that inscription in the quantifier. But Lesniewski does
not clarify precisely what he means when he writes that quantifiers are
primitive.
By calling quantifiers primitive, Lesniewski avoids discussion of the
relationship between the quantifier and the variously shaped parentheses
lOl Eugene C. Luschei , The Logical Systems Of Lesniewski, Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company , 1962, pp. 181 and 182.
102 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics " , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds ., Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Acade~ic Publishers, 1992, p. 419. - a quotation from Tarski 's doctoral thesis, a thesis he
supervised.
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which surround variables. I will discuss this relationship more fully in my
treatment ofLesniewski's mature notion of quantification (PART II below), but
it appears as if the quantifier bracket and the variable bracket are to be seen
as pointing to the same kinds of things, expressions, expressions whose "type,"
semantic category, is determined by the sh.ape of the parentheses surrounding
the variable.
3) What do quantifiers do?

Our third question - what do quantifiers do in Lesniewski's logical
systems? - requires two answers. "Internally", quantifiers (more correctly, the
variable(s) within the quantifier) "point to" or "govern" the inscription(s), the
term(s), equiform with it (them) in other parts of a thesis.
Externally, quantifiers point to the actual expressions of some language
of the same semantic category as indicated by the shape(s) of parentheses
surrounding the variables which it governs.
The "internal" relationships between the quantifier and the variable(s)
within a logical thesis is made explicit by Lesniewski's Terminological
Explanations and Directives.
The directives allow no possibility of introducing into the system
any kind of quantifier other than the previously mentioned
universal quantifier governing any number of variables.103
But Lesniewski's failure to carefully define the "external" relationship
between the quantifier and things outside his logical systems is the source of a
controversy over interpreting his quantifiers.
I believe that we can find evidence in both Lesniewski's "initial" and
mature works to support my contention that Lesniewski's quantifiers range

lOS Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Introductory Remarks to the Continuation

of My Article:
"Grundzuge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik" , Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans.
W. Teichmann, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 1992, p. 664.
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over the expressions of a language which are a priori arranged into semantic
categories, that is, his quantifiers can be interpreted substitutionally.
For hints, let us look at Lesniewski own works first.
PART II
1) Quantification In Lesniewski's "Initial Period"
Our scant knowledge ofLesniewski's notion of quantification begins with
"A Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves" 104written in his "initial
period."

In the early paper [25], where the theorems are not yet given in
symbolic notation, Lesniewski expressed the universal quantifier
by saying "prsy kazdem znaczeniu wyrazu 'a"' ("for every
meaning of the expression 'a"') and the particular quantifier by
saying "przy pewnym znaczeniu wyrazu 'a"' ("for some meaning
of the expression 'a"'); i.e. he explicitly referred to the meaning
of the expression.105
Lesniewski's uses the word "meaning" in this article and, therefore, may
mislead us in believing that "meaning" is to be used in the conventional sense.
I take the conventional sense of meaning to be semantic, that is the
simultaneous acknowledgment of an inscription being a word which denotes or
connotes or which does both. Lesniewski , during his "initial" period, believed
that words both denote and connote.
There is good evidence, that even during his "initial" period, Lesniewski
did not use "meaning" in the ordinary sense. I believe that it is best to think of
"meaning" more syntactically, that is as any "meaningful expression," an
inscription with meaning, but in the sense of an inscription being an expression
in any language.
l0 4 Stanislaw

Lesniewski, "Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves,
Subordinated to Itself?" , Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J.
Surma , Jan T. Srzednicki , and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 115-128.
105 Guido Kung, "The Meaning of the Quantifiers in the Logic of Lesniewski", Studia
Logica, April 1977, p. 319, fn. 9.
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A few examples will make Lesniewski's use of "meaning" more clear.
I shall call any object P an object subordinated to class Kif given
some meaning of the word 'a' the following two conditions are
fulfilled: (1) Kis a class of(objects) a;2 (2) Pis a. Examples: (A)
any human being C is subordinated to the class of human beings,
given that the word 'a' is employed to mean 'human being', both
the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled, and namely: (1) the
class of human beings is the class (of objects) a, (2) a human
being C is a ... 106
If this were our only example, we might think that "given some meaning

of the word 'a 111 is being used both syntactically and semantically, i.e. that we
must simultaneously choose an expression to be substituted for 'a,' consider
the denotation and/or connotation of that expression, and, then, determine the
truth or falsity of the new expression with the denotation and/or connotation of
the substituend[um] in mind. But "meaning" is not being used to indicate the
denotation and/or connotation of the substituend[um].

"Meaning" announces

the purely syntactic operation of substituting an expression for 'a,' that any
expression is to be substituted for 'a,' which is a variable in this case.
Lesniewski assumes that expressions of a language already have a "meaning."
Our observation is supported more clearly by a second example where
Lesniewski introduces the semantic notion of interpretation.
I shall call any object P' an object not subordinated to class K, is
with no interpretation of the meaning of the word 'a' the
following two conditions will be fulfilled together: (1) K is a class
(of objects) a; (2) P' is a (that is if given every possible meaning of
the word 'a' at least one of these conditions fails to be fulfilled). 107
The word "meaning" is still used, and still used syntactically as it was in
our first example, but Lesniewski's introduction of the word "interpretation"
adds the semantic dimension to his definition that one usually expects from the
106 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves,
Subordinated to Itself?", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J.
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 116 .
l0 7 Ibid ., p. 117.
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word 11meaning 11 alone. Lesniewski plainly intends that "meaning" be taken as
an equivalent to "substitution (of an expression of any language)."

I believe

that Lesniewski uses 11meaning 11 in order to assure that possible
substituendum are expressions of some language;

11

substitution

11

by itself

would not add the necessary connotation Lesniewski desired. That is the
reason, it seems to me, that he does not use the word "substitution."
"Meaning, 11 therefore, restricts the domain of quantification to
"meaningful" expressions of some language and not, as the use of
substitution

11

11

might imply, any inscription whatsoever. Given this restriction,

"meaningful" need not be taken semantically. An expression of some language
need not be interpreted prior to substitution.

By restricting the domain of

quantification, however, Lesniewski wants guarantee that what is substituted
for 1a 1 is an expression of some language.
Additionally, Lesniewski 1s parenthetical explanation in the last
quotation above supports our interpretation

that "meaning" is to be taken

syntactically. By the use of 11meaning 11 in that parenthetical explanation,
Lesniewski is simply instructing us to substitute every possible expression for
the word 1a; 1 "interpretation" clearly is to be taken semantically, that is, after
substituting an expression for 1a 1 we are then to 11read 11 the entire expression
with the denotation and/or connotation of the substituend[um] in mind.

In a like manner, Lesniewski uses 11meaningful 11 syntactically. In

11
•••

all

analogous meaningful theses can be proved ... 11108 , the expression "meaningful
theses" is being used syntactically, i.e. as an alternative expression for 11wellformed formula."

108 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds., Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki, and D .I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 450.
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And he uses "meaningful" syntactically in

11
••• P

and Q are any

meaningful propositions in Protothetic ... 11109
I could provide further support from Lesniewski's earlier works that
"meaning" is to be taken syntactically, that Lesniewski's notion of
"quantification" is substitutional

over a domain of expressions of some

language, but I believe that one more example will be sufficient.

Lesniewski

writes:
Substituting for the word 'a' its new meaning, that is the expression 'a
non-universe object', we obtain ... 110
The reading of this quote, and many others like it in the same article,
makes sense only if read syntactically. The "new meaning" of'a' in this
quotation is the expression 'a non-universe object.' The use of the word
"substituting" along with "meaning" adds significantly to my interpretation.
"New meaning" is merely an indication that Lesniewski is "substituting"
another expression for the old "meaning," the old expression.
Lesniewski also emphasizes the straight forward syntactic exchange of
expressions in his use of "meaning" through his use of single quotes. Single
quotes "mark" the variable "space" into which one expression is to be
substituted for another, i.e. one 'meaning' substituted for another 'meaning.' At
this point in the article, interpretation
of possible substituendum

is not relevant. Lesniewski's treatment

is isolated from any notion of denotation and/or

connotation of the expressions which are substituted.
Over and over in this article, Lesniewski uses the word "meaning" to
announce the syntactic operation of substituting expressions, that is to alert

109 Ibid., p. 463.
l10 Stanislaw Lesniewski,

"Is the Class of Classes not Subordinated to Themselves,
Subordinated to Itself? ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors, Stanislaw J.
Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 122
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us to the fact that some expression can be substituted for another. When we
are to pay attention to the denotation or connotation of a substituend(um), he
either uses the word "interpretation" or some another word like "compare." He
consistently maintains the distinction between these two operations.
2) Lesniewski's Mature Notion of Quantification.
I will show that Lesniewski's ideas about quantification in his mature
period are essentially unchanged from his "initial" period. His quantifiers
continue to range over the expressions of any language; he did not concern
himself with the "meaning" of the substituend( um) as long as it had "meaning",
i.e. was an expression of some language. After Lesniewski adopted Husserl's
notion of semantic categories and incorporated that notion into his own ideas
about quantification, Lesniewski lost interest in the actual "meaning" of an
expression; the fact that language includes only those inscriptions with
"meaning" and the fact that semantic categories a priori order those
expressions into groups to which reference can be in a logical system, released
Lesniewski from concern about semantics. He increasingly focused his
attention on the syntactical development of his logical systems.
Lesniewski , it should be mentioned, used conventional truth tables to
provide a formal semantics for Protothetic. Peter M. Simons provides an
interesting formal semantics for Lesniewski's Ontology. 111 I assume that
Simons' ideas could be extended to Lesniewski's Mereology, but Mereology,
according to some commentators,

112

is not, strictly speaking, a logical system.

111 Peter M. Simons, "A Semantics for Ontology", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985), pp. 193 -

216.
112 John T. Keams, "The Contribution

Of Lesniewski ", Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, Volume VIII, Nos. 1&2, (April, 1967 ), p. 65. "... only Protothetic and Ontology are,
properly speaking, logical systems. The constants introduced by Mereology are terms used
for relating objects in the world; they do not affect the grammatical structure oflanguage (in
contrast, the fundamental terms of a logical system are terms that bring with them a new
grammatical-syntactical structure). "
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[Mereology is not considered a logical system because it is built on
axioms and definitions which contain non logical constants, e.g. "cz" and "Kl."]
Lesniewski 1s first mention of quantification in his mature period is, oddly
enough, the place where he refers to his use of "quantifiers" in his "initial"
period.

(at the time I did not yet know how to operate with
quantifiers, 14 and requiring in the colloquial language which I
was using, some equivalents of expressions of the type (3a). f
(a)1,1(3X, a). f(X,a)1,etc. familiar in 1symbolic' language, 15 I used
corresponding expression of the type 'for some meanings of
expressions 'X1 and 1a ftX, a)1and the like, treating these
complicated expressions in the same way in practice, mutatis
mutandis, as one would treat the corresponding expressions of
the types 1(3a). f (a)1,1(3X, a)1,etc. 113
•This quotation is interesting, not only because it reflects Lesniewski 1s mature
thoughts on quantification, but also because, in footnote 14 (quoted
immediately below), he references and adopts aspects of Peirce's notion of
quantifiers.
See: C. S. Peirce, On the Algebra of Logic, 'A contribution to the
Philosophy of Notation', American Journal of Mathematics, VII, 1885,
p. 197. 114
Pierce indexed quantifiers and variables in order to indicate the universe
of discourse which those quantifiers and variables referenced. Lesniewski
constructed his logical systems in a way to avoid indexing either his quantifiers
or his variables. A more complete treatment of this footnote to Pierce, though
important because it supports my contention that Lesniewski viewed
quantification substitutionally, would interrupt the flow of this section and can
be, therefore, found in Appendix D.

113 Stanislaw Lesniewski , "On The Foundations Of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 203.
114 Ibid., p. 203.
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There is nothing in the quotation above which would lead us to believe
that Lesniewski's "mature" notion of quantification has changed from that of
his "initial period." As a matter of fact, by making reference to an earlier work
and by not challenging the views on quantification he held there, Lesniewski,
himself, supports my assertion that his notion of quantification has not
changed. And, if Lesniewski had changed his notion of quantification, this
would have been the most appropriate place to describe that change. Instead,
Lesniewski provides a symbolically equivalent way of expressing a notion of
quantification which he was only able to express colloquially during his "initial"
period.
In Lesneiwski's published works, I have found nothing to indicate that
Lesniewski changed his mind about quantifiers. I have found nothing in the
works of his students to indicate that Lesniewski thought about quantifiers in
a way other than I have presented above. There is no evidence that
Lesniewski presented an interpretation of quantification different from what
we find in his published works, especially when we take into account Peirce's
influence.

It was Lesniewski's habit to pay particular attention to the use of
symbols in logical systems. We need only recall Lesniewski 's treatment of
Whitehead and Russell's use the assertion sign in "Principia Mathematica" to
remind ourselves of the weight Lesniewski placed on such detail. Lesniewski
advised "careful readers" of "Principia" to ignore the assertion sign because
any attempt to interpret the sign creates so many alternative interpretations
that the issue of interpretation cannot be clearly decided.
The variety of interpretations
... illustrates very well the doubts of a semantic nature ...
. . . which can repel an interest in 'logistic' for a considerable
number of scientific workers who are not satisfied just by the
54

delights of writing signs and the transformation of formulas, and
who - in contrast to the devotees of empty mathematics (and
such occur) - wish to understand the meaning of the transfol'ffled
formulas and to know 'of what' and 'what', respectively, 'of what'
and 'what' it is wished to assert by means of those formulas. 115
It is difficult to believe that Lesniewski would have introduced an
obscure or unique notion of quantification into his logical systems without
carefully preparing a written justification, without having given lectures on
quantification, without some evidence of that unique notion appearing in the
works of his students.
From Lesniewski's point of view, then, quantifiers refer to the
expressions of actual languages and, therefore, the expressions of these actual
languages are the things which may be substituted for the variables of his
logical systems.
3) Remarks
The discussion of certain features ofLesniewski's logical systems in this
Chapter, along with the brief discussion of some of the axioms and definitions of
Ontology and Mereology found in Chapters II and III above, it is clear that
Lesniewski did construct his logical systems in order to avoid "talk" about
things other than quite ordinary objects. In that respect, Lesniewski
constructed his logical systems to accommodate his nominalistic tendencies.
That he did not develop a philosophical doctrine to support the construction of
his logical systems does not diminish his nominalistic motivation.
Direct knowledge of Lesniewski's nominalism is limited to those issues
discussed in the preceding Chapters. There is, however, additional, but indirect
evidence of his nominalism which will be discussed in the next chapter.

115 Ibid., pp. 194 and 195.
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Chapter V - Additional Considerations.
Introduction:
As we move toward a characterization of Lesniewski's nominalism,

several additional issues should be addressed.
I believe that it is necessary to address the fact that Lesniewski never
characterized himself a nominalist. I will examine Lesniewski's formalism and
his intuitionism in the first section of this Chapter. These considerations are
speculative but necessary.
I also believe that no characterization of Lesniewski is complete without
a mention of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, a close friend of Lesniewski's who can
provide several important insights into Lesniewski's mature thinking on
several topics pertinent to Lesniewski's nominalism. I will consider those
topics in the second section of this Chapter.
In the last section of this Chapter, I will consider several recent
characterizations ofLesniewski's nominalism which appear to be
exaggerations.
1) Lesniewski's Formalism and Intuitionism
Lesniewski's beliefs about what exists in the world and the way in which
he constructed his logical systems are nominalistic, but he never called himself
a nominalist.

He characterizes himself quite differently?

I see no contradiction, therefore, in saying that I advocate a
rather radical 'formalism' in the construction ofmy system even
though I am an obdurate 'intuitionist' .116
W. V. Quine, I believe, provides a reason that Lesniewski might call
himself a formalist and rather than a nominalist.

116

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki, D.I . Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 487.
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The three main medieval points of view regarding universals are
designated by historians as realism, conceptualism, and
nominalism. Essentially these same three doctrines reappear in
twentieth-century surveys of the philosophy of mathematics
under the new names logicism, intuitionism, andformalism. 117
Quine believes that formalists

11
•••like

the nominalists of old, object to

admitting abstract entities at all, even in the restrained sense of mind-made
entities.

11118 Lesniewski's

philosophical inclinations fit Quine's description quite

well.
The other half of the characterization - the fact that Lesniewski also
calls himself an intuitionist - is not as easy to deal with. For Quine the modern
intuitionist shares a belief with his medieval counterpart, the conceptualist,
that universals exist in the mind. Lesru~ wski does not believe that universals
exist in the world and he never tells us whether or not he believes they exist in
the mind. Lesniewski's own characterization of his intuition is, most likely, a
better guide to what he means by intuition .
...in my system the expressions are treated as a hypotheticaldeductive system, from which it follows that, properly speaking, I
assert only that those propositions which I call 'theorems' result
from the propositions which I call 'axioms'. The psychic 'sources'
of my axioms are my intuitions, which simply means, that I
believe in the truth of my axioms, but I am unable to say why I
believe, since I am not acquainted with the theory of causality. 119
Although Lesniewski wrote this in 1916, there is no reason to believe that his
attitude changed. Accompanying his 11shift 11in focus was a shift in attitude.
He wrote nothing in his 11mature" period to defend his intuition; he simply
developed his logical systems.
117 Willard Van Orman Quine, "On What There Is", Universals

And Particulars: Reading
In Ontology, Editor Michael J. Loux, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970,
p. 28.
118 Ibid. , p. 29.
119 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Foundations of the General Theory of Sets." , Stanislaw
Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett,
Trans. D. I. Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp.
130 and 131.
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Although Jan Lukasiewicz may not have had Lesniewski in mind, he
makes an important observation about logicians of the Polish School Of Logic.
While in practice they adopted the nominalistic standpoint, the
logicians, as far as I see, have not yet discussed nominalism
thoroughly enough as a philosophical doctrine. 120
And, he also observed, that:
... while we use nominalistic terminology, we are not true
nominalists but incline toward some unanalyzed conceptualism
or even idealism.121
2) Evidence ofLesniewski's Nominalism in the Works ofTadeusz

Kotarbinski.
Tadeusz Kotarbinski offers three valuable insights into Lesniewski's
thinking during his "mature" period. First, Kotarbinski confirms the fact that
Lesniewski abandoned the notion of connotation. Secondly, Kotarbinski
provides evidence about Lesniewski's thoughts on epistemology. Thirdly,
Kotarbinski accepted Lesniewski's "proofs" as proof that universals did not
exist. I believe that one must understand the close relationship which existed
between these two men in order to appreciate the importance ofKotarbinski's
comments on Lesniewski's thinking.
Kotarbinski and Lesniewski had remarkably similar academic careers
and, interestingly enough, were even born in the same year, 1886. They both
received their Ph.D. in 1912 from Lvov University; they both studied with
Kasimir Twardowski at Lvov University; they both spent the war years (19151918) in Moscow; they were both given teaching post at Warsaw University

after the war - Kotarbinski in 1918, Lesniewski in 1919; they both began to
publish works that defined the direction of their mature philosophy in the late
120 Jan Lukasiewicz,

Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works, Editor L. Borkowski, North-Holland
Publishing Co., 1970, p. 223.
121 Jan Lukasiewicz, "Logistic And Philosophy", Jan Lukasiewicz Selected Works,
Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970, p. 224.
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1920's - that is when Kotarbinski published 11Gnosiology 11 and Lesniewski began
publication of "On The Foundations Of Mathematics;" they both taught at
WarsawUniversityuntil

the beginningofthe

Second World War. There

association, unfortunately, ended with Lesniewski's early death in 1939.
Their respect was mutual. In the preface to the first edition of
11

Gnosiology, 11 Kotarbinski acknowledges his intellectual debt to Lesniewski as

follows:
But certainly I have learned most from Professor Stanislaw
Lesniewski. I explicitly indicate this in the various places in the
text, but those indications pertain only to the most important
points. But I admit that all my reflections have been imbued
with the influence of that extraordinary intellect of whose
priceless gifts favourable fortune has enabled me to partake for
many years in almost daily contact. I am decidedly a pupil of
Professor Lesniewski whom I have the pleasure here of
thanking cordially and respectfully for all he has ever taught
me.122

Lesniewski returns the compliment in "On The Foundations Of
Mathematics" indirectly by quoting lengthy sections from 11Gnosiology, 11
sections which he offers as accurate statements of his own thinking, and
directly as follows:
On the part of one of those authors, Dr. Tadeusz Kotarbinski,
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Warsaw, my dear
friend and colleague from student years - my ontology has met
with a systematic and favourable scientific support from the time
of its birth. Judging favourably the theory which I had
concocted, Kotarbinski introduced its elements into his lectures
at the university for a number of years, and also expressed
himself decidedly in its favour in his new work entitled 'Elements
of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology' as
is clear from the section which, full of pride, I introduce shortly. From the remote period of our common 'philosophical' past when
each one of us, pursuing our various aims, was straying along
blind alleys in semantics and theories of 'truth', whether in a
pilgrimage to the unpromising land of'free activity' or in
122 Tadeusz Kotarbinski,

Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,
Trans . Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York:
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. xii.
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disorganized flight from the formidable spectre of Epimenides' The Liar and other fearsome creatures belching contradictions, I
became accustomed to check my various ideas and theoretical
projects in scientific discussions with Tadeusz Kotarbinski: I
availed myself on various occasions of his subtle analytical help;
I constantly referred to his sharp insights during the
establishment of various assumptions in the different deductive
theories which I was constructing; I listened to his relevant and
fair critical observations and felt concerned whenever I deviated
too much from his theoretical conceptions ofmy own views.
The most sincere joy fills my heart in the light of the fact that, as
far as my ontology is concerned, I have established right to claim
that in Tadeusz Kotarbinski I have a learned ally. 123
A) Lesniewski abandoned the notion of connotation.

Kotarbinski's reference to Lesniewski's thoughts on connotation are
straightforward.
While concretism owed its birth to the renunciation of the idea
that properties inhere in things, Lesniewski freed himself from
the concept of connotation in the interpretation of the truth of a
singular sentence with the subject- copula - subjective
complement structure. Under Mill's influence, he used to state
that such a sentence is true if the object denoted by the subject
has the property connoted by the subjective complement.
Reconsideration of the problem led him, however, to a formula
free from "connotation" and hence also from "property". That
formula states that a singular sentence with the subject - copula
- subjective complement structure (of the type "Ais B") is true, if
the object denoted by the subject is the object denoted by the
subjective complement.124
B) Lesniewski believed in "immanent images."

Lesniewski does not discuss the "existence of immanent images"1 25 in
his published works, therefore, Kotarbinski provides us an important insight to
Lesniewski's mature epistemology. When Kotarbinski discusses "immanent
images," he writes:
123 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On the Foundations of Mathematics" , Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I.
Barnett , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 371-373.
124 Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Gnosiology, The Scientific Approach to the Theory of Knowledge,
Trans. Olgierd Wojtasiewicz, Ed. G. Bidwell and C. Pinder, Oxford and New York:
Pergamon Press, 1966, p. 430 .
125 Ibid., p. 430.
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Now reism (for Kotarbinski, reism is the belief that objects are
as we perceive them in the world. - my note.) dared to storm the
stronghold of that doctrine [the doctrine that "immanent images"
exist - my note], without availing itself of Lesniewski's assistance,
since that assistance was in this matter refused.1 26
What are immanent images?
Lesniewski, evidently, believed that for us to determine the truth or
falsity of the existence of something in the world: first, something in the world
must exist; simultaneously, if we look at that something we have an image of
it, an immanent image, and, therefore, that that immanent image exists and;
then, there is a correspondence between the existent thing in the world and our
immanent image ofit . Knowledge of the world, therefore, is contingent on our
having images of things in the world and our being able to compare the
immanent image with a particular thing in the world. This comparison or
realization that we have an image of something in the world seems to take
place simultaneously with "seeing" a thing in the world. For the radical realist,
Kotarbinski, immanent images do not exist, so the existence or non-existence
of a thing in the world is not contingent on our image of them.
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What does this have to do with Lesniewski's nominalism? Would it be
consistent for a nominalist to believe in immanent images? From
Kotarbinski's discussion it is difficult to say. Immanent images do not seem
like universals or a type of abstract entity. It is possible, of course, but not at
all certain, that Lesniewski believed that immanent images were things, but
we do not know. The importance ofKotarbinski's reference to Lesniewski's
belief in immanent images is that we are given a glimpse ofLesniewski's
epistemology, however slight, which Lesniewski, himself, does not offer in his
published works.
126 Ibid. p. 431.
127 Ibid., p. 85.
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C) Lesniewski Proved That Universals Do Not Exist
Kotarbinski, at the time of his life when he wrote 11Gnosiology", was an
enthusiastic extreme nominalist, though later in his life he viewed nominalism
as just another interesting hypothesis. As we have learned from our brief
sketch ofTwardowski's influence on the Polish School, there was a great
tolerance, even enthusiastic support, for a wide divergence of philosophical
beliefs amongst the philosophers of the Polish School. There is no reason to
believe that Lesniewski embraced Kotarbinski's beliefs, any more than we can
burden Kotarbinski with Lesniewski's beliefs, however, Kotarbinski did believe
that Lesniewski proved that universals did not exist .
. . .universals, are the first to fall victim to eliminating analysis as
carried out by nominalism; it might be said it was only
concerning them that nominalism succeeded in convincingly
proving their non-existence by a reductio ad absurdum. 128
Now, Lesniewski provided proofs, i.e. his first "proof' and his second
"proof' against the existence of "general" objects. It is important to realize
that Kotarbinski did not call Lesniewski a nominalist in "Gnosiology".
3) Recent Characterizations

ofLesniewski's Nominalism.

Most authors who discuss Lesniewski's nominalism mention the
nominalistic construction and interpretation

of his logical systems and the fact

that he offered "proofs" against the existence of "general" objects. More recent
characterizations,

however, make it appear as if Lesniewski actually

developed a philosophical doctrine to support his nominalistic tendencies.
Peter Simons in his 1985 article "A Semantics for Ontology" writes:
... Lesniewski was a staunch nominalist. Not only did he not
believe in the existence of abstract entities, but, more than any
other logician, he went out of his way to avoid doing logic as if
there were such entities.129
128 Ibid., p. 55.
129 Peter M. Simons, "A Semantics for Ontology", Dialectica, Vol. 39, No.
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3 (1985), p. 195.

And Jan Wolenski in his 1989 book "Logic And Philosophy In The LvovWarsaw School" writes:
Lesniewski was a declared nominalist.130
These characterizations

seem to imply that Lesniewski developed a

nominalistic philosophy. The fact that Lesniewski withdrew his criticism of
specific notions of universals by the time he developed his second "proof' and
the fact that his logical systems are ontologically neutral, seem to contradict
such strong characterizations.

Lesniewski's philosophical tendencies support

a limited sort of nominalism.

130 Jan Wolenski, Logic And Philosophy In The Lvov-Warsaw School, Kluwer Academic
Publishers,

1989, p. 194.
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Summary and Conclusion:
If a nominalist believes that particular things exist, then Lesniewski 1s

beliefs do support that aspect ofnominalism.

In Lesniewski s published works
1

and in accounts of his philosophical attitudes, one can say he sympathized
with those who believed that the world was populated by quite ordinary objects
and nothing more. It seems clear from his belief in immanent images and his
belief that language can be used to denote things, that he also believed that
there is some sort of a correspondence between objects in the world and the
language we use to talk about the world and, therefore, he believed that there is
some sort of a correspondence between mind and the world . From this , we can
infer that Lesniewski believed that we can know things which exist in the
world, even though he rejected epistemology. He did not, however, develop a
philosophical doctrine to support these beliefs. As a matter of fact , Lesniewski
abandoned all discussion of the traditional issues of philosophy.
If a nominalist believes that only particular things exist, then

Lesniewski 1s 11proofs 11 against the existence of 11general objects,11things of a
different sort than individual objects, can be considered qualified support of
that aspect of nominalism. Lesniewski, however, did not enter the
realist/nominalist debate over the existence of universals, so his 11proofs, 11 even
if they were valid, are 11proofs 11 against the existence of one kind of universal.
Lesniewski 1s nominalism, then, is a highly qualified sort. Beyond the
philosophical inclinations mentioned , his nominalism must be inferred from the
way in which he constructed his logical systems and in the ways in which those
systems are interpreted.
Lesniewski constructed his logical systems very precisely in order to
avoid the possibility of contradiction and, in doing so, he treated the theses of
his systems like particular things and he believed that his quantifiers actually
64

"pointed" to the expressions of actually existing languages. Although his logical
systems are said to be ontologically neutral , that is hardly support for a
nominalist belief that particular things actually exist in the world, it seems
that he believed that his notion of quantification allowed him to avoid reference
to things other than particular things , if, in fact, particular things exist. The
kind of nominalism we can infer from the construction and interpretation of his
logical systems, then, is as highly qualified as the nominalism which his
philosophcial inclinations support .
In the final analysis, it is best to say that Lesniewski was a philosopher
who created formal language with which one could consistently 11talk. 11 about
objects. A more complete understanding of his philosophy is available only to
those who would use and expand his logical systems.

65

AppendixA
Aristotle's Theory Of Universals Applied To Natural Objects.
For Aristotle a natural object is a particular and a "substance" which is
a composite of two different "substances", i.e. matter (substratum) and form,
neither of which exists separately. So, matter and form both actually exist in a
natural object (in a particular) as two different kinds of "substance" and not as
aspects of the particular. Aristotle, therefore, rejected a kind ofnominalism
(fn. 329-330), i.e. what exists is only matter, and he also rejected a kind of

universalism (fn. 329-330), i.e. what exists is only form. Actually, Aristotle's
realism might be viewed as an effort to unite nominalism and universalism,
since he believed that a natural object is a combination of the 'particulars'
(individuals) of nominalism and the 'formed' (universals) of universalism.
There are three kinds of substance - the matter, which is a 'this'
by being perceived (for all things that are characterized by
contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum);
the nature, a 'this' and a state that it moves towards; and again,
thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two,
e.g. Socrates or Callias.131
Aristotle also believed that we know matter and form - and, therefore,
the composite, the natural object or particular - in two different ways. Form is
known by the thinking part of the soul.
The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while
impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is,
must be potentially identical in character with its object without
being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable,
as sense is to what is sensible.13 2
Matter is 11known 11 through sensation.
Since it seems that there is nothing outside and separate in
existence from sensible spacial magnitudes, the objects of
thought are in sensible forms, viz. both the abstract objects and
131 Aristotle, The Complete Works Of Aristotle, 2 Volumes , ed. Jonathan Barnes,
Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1985, p. 1690.
132 Ibid. , p. 682.
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all the states and affections of sensible things. Hence no one can
learn or understand anything in absence of sense, and when the
mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware ofit
along with an image; for images are like sensuous contents
except in that they contain no matter.1 33
The relationship between what is known, i.e. matter and form, and the
way we know these things, sensation and thinking, must be carefully
considered because Aristotle, at times, seems to blur the distinction between
the outer, i.e. what is known, and the inner, i.e. how we know, it appears as if
what is universal, that is, form, is really in the mind and not a substance in the
natural object or particular .
... the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the
heard, etc., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what actual
sensation apprehends is individuals , while what knowledge apprehends is
universals, and these are in a sense within the soul itself. That is why a
man can think when he wants to but his sensation does not depend upon
himself - a sensible object must be there. A similar statement must be
made about our knowledge of what is sensible - on the same ground, viz.
that the sensible objects are individual and external.134
And when Aristotle considers particulars and universals from a
linguistic point of view, the universal seems to be a general term existing only
in the mind. This appears to confirm Aristotle's observation that

11
•••

universals

... are in a sense within the soul itself. 11
Now of actual things some are universal, other particulars (I
call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number
of things, and particular that which is not; man, for instance, is a
universal, Callias a particular). 135
Yet Aristotle clearly writes that:
... no univer sal exists apart from t h em. divi .dua 1s. 136
What Aristotle fails to make absolutely explicit is the difference between 'what
is universal in a particular', i.e. form, that is something which we know directly
133 Ibid., p. 686.
134 Ibid., p. 664.
135 Ibid ., p. 27.

136 Ibid.,

p. 1643 .
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in thinking, and our knowledge of form as it exists in our mind (in the soul).
Knowing form in a particular produces knowledge of "what is universal in that
particular", to be sure, but, when we come to know the identical form in many
particulars, our knowledge is of the same universal is now a mixture of the
immediate knowledge of a natural thing with that specific form and our
knowledge (memory) of past experiences of that form.
Psychology was in its infancy in Aristotle's time, however, he did
acknowledge the role of memory on producing an experience:
... from memory experience is produced in men; for many
memories of the same thing produce finally the capacity for a
single experience.137
Aristotle believed that knowledge of a universal is prior to "knowlege" of
particulars; his order of knowledge is quite advanced.
The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which
are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those
which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same
things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without
qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from
what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what
is more clear and more knowable by nature .
"Now what is plain and clear at first is rather confused masses,
the elements and principles of which become known to us later
by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to
particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sen~eperception, and a universal is a kind of whole, compr~hending
many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing ~~pp~ns
in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. ~ir~le ,
means vaguely a sort of whole: i~ definitio?- analyses this mto
particulars. Similarly a child begins by calling all men father,
and all women mother, but later on distinguishes each ofthem.138
bserva tions ofhow we come to know natural objects is very sophisticated.
th way we learn
fi t learn about the world is not the same as e
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universals contributes to our knowledge of universals. A child may call all
spherical things "ball," until he learns to distinguish between one spherical
thing and another.
Conclusion:
Aristotle believed that natural objects were composite of two different
kinds of things. This beliefis spread throughout his written works and he
discusses particulars and universals from many points of view , so that the
language he uses varies, sometimes slightly, sometimes more radically, in the
way he treats these two primitive things. Sometimes , as for example in his
treatment of "substance", he reaches conclusions indirectly almost
deductively; matter and form almost seem to be hypotheses.
And , in general, if only the sensible exists, there would be
nothing if animate things were not; for there would be no
faculty of sense [i.e. faculty of sense in an animate object - my
note]. The view that neither the objects of sensation nor the
sensations would exist [i.e. if there were no sensible things - my
note] is doubtless true (for they are affections of the perceiver ),
but that the substrata which cause the sensation should not exist
even apart from sensation is impossible. For sensation is surely
not the sensation of itself, but there is something beyond the
sensation, which must be prior to the sensation; for that which
moves is prior in nature to that which is moved , ... 139
The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the
bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and
the formless before receiving form to anything which has form,
so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the 'this' or
existent. 140
The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in
another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it
ceases to be in its own nature ; for what ceases to be - the
privation - is contained within it . But as potentiality it does not
cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the
sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For ifit came to be ,
something must have existed as a primary substratum from
which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its
own very nature , so that it will be before coming to be. (For my
definition of matter is just this - the primary substratum of each
139 Ibid. , p. 1596 .
140 Ibid ., p . 326.
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thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the
result, not accidentally.)141
He also gives examples which make it clear that he derives the existence of
matter and from directly from evidence provided through the observation of
natural objects. I summarize: That a sphere (form) and a circle (form) can
both be bronze demonstrates for Aristotle that different forms can be made of
. the same kind of matter and that a sphere can be both bronze (matter) and
wood (matter) demonstrates that one form can be present in different matter;
these facts provide evidence for Aristotle that natural objects are a
combination of both form and matter.

It is clear that Aristotle's "Theory of Universals" is an hypothesis
meant to give an account of the perceived stability and the instability of
natural objects. For the purposes of this thesis, it has been sufficient to detail
the way in which Aristotle regarded natural objects. In our further discussons
of nominalism, it will be useful to have an exact account of what Aristotle
believed to exist and how he believed we come to know these existents.

141 Ibid ., p.

328.
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AppendixB.
Lesniewski's First Proof:
"In order to prove the thesis that no object is 'general', I shall argue by
reductio ad absurdum. I assume that there is an object Pk which is 'general'
and it conesponds to 'individual' objects P'1,P'2,P'3, ... , P'n; for every 'individual
object' P'k, one can always find certain property Ck which is not common to all
'individual' objects P'l, P'2, P 13, ... , P'n• On the basis of the above the 'general
object' P'k [misprint in text; should read Pk- my note.] does not possess the
property Ck (I). The 'individual' object P'k possessing the property Ck does not
possess the property of not possessing the property Ck. It is so because ifit
possessed the property of not possessing the property Ck, i.e. ifit was not
possessed of the property Ck, then it would be contradictory since it would be
an object both possessing and not possessing the property Ck. The property of
not possessing the property Ckis not common to all 'individual' objects P'1, P'2,
P'3, ... , P'n because any 'individual' object P'k possesses the property Ck.
Consequently the 'general' object P'k [misprint in text; should read Pk- my
note.] cannot possess the property of not possessing the property Ck,
therefore it is not possessed of the property Ck, ergo it possesses the property
Ck (II). From the comparison of the theses (I) and (II) it follows that the
assumption that any object Pk is 'general' leads to contradiction because it
implies that this object both possesses the property Ck (I) and does not
possess it (II). We conclude that the assumption that any object is 'general' is
false. I believe that the above reasoning demonstrates that no object is a
universal or general object. 11142

142 Stanislaw Lesniewski, "The Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middel",
Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I.
Barnett, Trans. S. J. Surma and J. Wojcik, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991, pp. 51 and 52.
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AppendixC.
Lesniewski's Second Proof
11
•••

to all those who, by reason of the meaning they give to expressions of

the type 'general object with respect to objects a 1, are inclined to state the
proposition 1if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis b, and Y is a,
1

then Yis b', I wish to state here that this proposition entails the proposition if
there exist at least two different a, then a general object with respect to objects
a does not exist', in accordance with the following schema:
(1) if Xis a general oQject with respect to oQjects a, Xis b, also Y is a, then Y is
b. (assumption) from (1) it results, that
(2) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis different from Z, and Z
is a, then Z is different from Z,
and
(3) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, Xis identical with Z, and Y
is a, then Y is identical with Z;
from (2) it follows, that
(4) if Xis a general object with respect to objects a, and Z is a, then Xis
identical with Z,
from (4) however, that,
(5) ifX is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a, then (Xis
a general object with respect to objects a, Xis identical with Z, and Y is a);
from (5) and (3) it follows, that,
(6) ifX is a general object with respect to objects a, Z is a, and Y is a, then Y is
identical with Z,
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from (6) however, that if there exist at least two different a, then a general
object with respect to objects a, does not exist. 11143

143

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "On the Foundations of Mathematics", Stanislaw Lesniewski
Collected Works, Eds. Stanislaw J. Surma, Jan T. Srzednicki, D.I. Barnett, Trans. D. I.
Barnett, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992, pp. 198 and
199.
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AppendixD.
Peirce Footnote
On page 53 above, I make reference to a footnote, footnote 14, on page
203 of "Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works" which directs our attention to
Peirce.
See: C. S. Peirce, On the Algebra of Logic, 'A contribution to the
Philosophy of Notation' , American Journal of Mathematics, VII, 1885,
p. 197. 144
This footnote is mentioned in almost every article which discusses
Lesniewskian quantification. Commentators, however, generally quote from
an article by Tarski in which the same reference is made to the same Peirce
article as Lesniewski makes above, but Tarski's reference is believed to have
included an actual quotation from the Peirce article and not just a reference to
page 197 of the article. Commentators usually mention the fact that
Lesniewski, in alaterwork145,

actually quotes the entire Tarski reference,

including what is taken to be an actual quotation form the Peirce article.
Tarski's reference, which includes what is believed to be an actual quotation for
Peirce, is found in footnote 3 of his article , which reads as follows:
3

In the sense of Peirce (see Peirce, C. S. (58a), p. 197) who gives this
name to the symbols 'II' (universal quantifier) and 'I' (particular or
existential quantifier) representing abbreviations of the expressions: 'for
every signification of the terms ... ' and 'for some signification of the
terms ... '146
For the sake of completeness, I provide the sentence in the body of
Tarski's article to which footnote above is attached:

144 Ibid., p. 203.
145

Stanislaw Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Eds . Stanislaw J. Surma , Jan T.
Srzednicki , D.I. Barnett, Trans. M. P. O'Neil, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers , 1992 ,pp. 419 and 420 .
146
Alfred Tarski, Logic. Semantics, Meta-Mathematics. Hackett Publishing Company,
1983, p. 1, fn. 3.
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The problem of which I here offer a solution is the following: is it
possible to construct a system of logistic in which the sign of equivalence is
the only primitive sign (in addition of course to the quantifiers3) 147
This sentence is a statement of the problem Tarski addressed in his
doctoral thesis, a thesis written under the direction of Lesniewski - Tarski was
the only doctoral student Lesniewski ever supervised. Although it is obvious
from the quote, it is important to mention that Tarski considered quantifiers to
be primitive signs.
Let us return to the Lesniewski's and Tarski's reference to Peirce.

I have not found a commentator who mentions that Tarski actually
misquotes Peirce. Nowhere on page 197, as a matter of fact nowhere in
Peirce's article, do we find the phrases '"for every signification of the terms .. .111
and '"for some signification of the terms ... "'. AB a matter of fact, the only
possible section on page 197 of Peirce's article to which Tarski (and
Lesniewski) could reasonably be referencing, is the "4th" "step" of Peirce's
instructions for manipulating indices , namely, instructions for 11••• making the
indices refer to the same collections of objects ...".
On pages 194 and 195 of Peirce's article, there are phrases similar to
the ones Tarski quotes:
Thus LiXimeans thatxis •true of some one of the individuals denoted by
i or LiXi= Xi+ Xj+ xk + etc. In the same way , ffixi means that xis true of
all these individuals, or ffixi = XiXjXk,etc.148
But there are no phrases closer than these to the ones Tarski attributes
to Peirce.
I believe that both Lesniewski and Tarski refer to Peirce, not so much

for the phrases which Peirce uses to translate the symbolic logic tokens for
147 Ibid., p . 1.
148 Peirce , C. S., "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution To The Philosophy Of Notation ",
American Journal Of Mathematics,

Vol. VII , 1885 , p. 197.
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universal and particular quantifiers into ordinary language, but because they
both actually make use of Peirce's instructions for "... making the indices refer
to the same collections of objects ... " in their own works on logic.

In order to see the relevance of the Peirce reference to Lesniewski's
notion of quantification, I have used Peirce's notation to notate Lesniewski's
Axiom of Ontology. Lesniewski's Axiom of Ontology using Peirce's notation
would look something like this:
[IT:xenITx'enJ::Xen E x'en .: = :. -. [ITYenJ-. ( Yen E Xen):
[IT Yen IT Zen] Yen E Xen. Zen E Xen. =>. Yen E zen:
[ITYen]Yen E Xen. =>•Yen E x'en
Peirce used indices to make explicite the collection of things outside his
system to which his quantifiers "pointed". In my example, each variable is
indexed, actually double-indexed (11indices ofindices"149 for Peirce). Ifwe
assume that Lesniewski quantified over expressions of any language which are
a priori ordered into semantic categories, then first index, "e" of my example
symbolizes expressions of any language, the widest range of things which can
be subsituted for the variable. The second index, "n", symbolizes the semantic
category of the expression (nouns) which can be substituted for the particular
variables of this axiom. By specifying the semantic category the range of
quantification is further restricted to noun expressions; for Lesniewski, the
functor "e" required two expressions of the semantic category of nouns.

It is important to note that, for Peirce, variables were always to be
replaced by tokens.150 Peirce's use of the word "token" is very close to
Lesniewski's use of the word "expression" (another reason for choosing "e" as
the first index in the Peirce notated Axiom of Ontology above). I assume that
neither Lesniewski nor Tarski restricted their reading of Peirce to page 197 of
149 Ibid ., p. 199.

15 0 Ibid ., p. 199.
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the above quoted article. I assume that they read and understood the entire
article and, perhaps other articles of Peirce as well.
What we realize from this analysis is that Lesniewski could and did drop
the first index by simply restricting his universe of discourse to expressions .
Lesniewski was able to avoid using the second index and , therefore, the use of
indices altogether by using variously shaped parenthesis to mark the semantic
categories of the variables of his logical systems .
. . .I adopted from my 1theory oftypes 1, ••• ,a variability in parentheses
that depends upon semantical categories of the particular expressions
involved. 151
The phrases Tarski seems to quote from Peirce 1s article are not direct
quotations at all . When we realize that the Peirce footnote appears, in Tarski 1s
original works, in either Polish or French, then we understand that those
phrases, 111For every signification of the terms
the terms

111

111

and 111for some signification of

couldjust as well be translated into english as 11for every meaning

of the terms 11 and 11for some meaning of the terms

11
,

respectively. These

phrases represent precisely Lesniewski 1s notion of quantification during his
11

initial 11 period. By quoting Peirce, therefore, Tarski simply wishes to express

the concurrance of Lesniewski 1s and Peirce 1s notions of quantification.
Ifwe do not take Peirce 1s indices as an alternate way to describe both
Lesniewski 1s and Tarski 1s range of quantification, then the fact that both
Lesniewski and Tarski quoted Peirce makes no sense. If we cannot index
Lesniewski 1s variables to expressions and semantic categories, again, quoting
Peirce makes no sense.

151 Stanislaw

Lesniewski, "Fundamentals of a New System of the Foundations of
Mathematics ", Stanislaw Lesniewski Collected Works, Editors , Stanislaw J . Surma, Jan T.
Srzednicki, and D.I. Barnett , Trans. M. P. O'Neil , Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992, p. 453.
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After reading Peirce's article, Lesniewski, it seems, not only understood
that variables needed to be indexed to a specified range of expressions, but also,
ifhe choose a fixed universe of discourse for all the varibles of his logical
systems, then no index was required. Dropping the index made his own
systems less cumbersome. Lesniewski's use of variously shaped parenthesis
to enclose variables that could only be replaced by expressions of a certain
semantic category seems to be a more elegent and a more "iconical" way of
showing a correspondence between the semantic categories of any language
and the semantic categories ofLesniewski's logical systems. Lesniewski's
methods of "indexing" variables is syntactically superior because his variables
are, then, not burdened with any other duty than as place holders and as
primitive expressions of the particular semantic category indicated by the
shape of the parentheses sun·ounding them. Indices, it seems to me, are not
as simple syntactically as Lesniewski's parentheses;

indices seem to confuse

the notion of simple substitution.
That Peirce had a significant influence on the development of
Lesniewski's logical systems is further supported in Lesniewski's mature
works by a continuous reference to words, terms, expressions, and, in general,
to linguistic entities. Lesniewski's mature writing makes absolutely no sense,
unless the syntactic development of symbols in his logical systems somehow
finds a correspondence to the expressions of natural language.
Certain other similarities to Lesniewski's logical systems appear in
Peirce's article and, although they are not pertinent to our discussion, I
mention these similarities because they are interesting; they show, I believe,
that Peirce's influence on Lesniewski's intellectual development was greater
that a simple reference might indicate.
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Peirce treated terms taken in the distributive sense separately from
terms treated in a collective sense. Though it might seem that

11

externally

11

Peirce's quantifiers 11pointed to 11 objects in the world, we see in the quote below,
that that opinion is a bit too simplistic.
The index [quantifier - my note] asserts nothing; it only says 11There! 11
It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a
particular object, and there it stops. Demonstrative and relative
pronouns are nearly pure indices, because they denote things without
describing them; so are the letters on a geometrical diagram, and the
subscript numbers which in algebra distinguish one value from another
without saying what those values are. 152
Peirce attempts to describe the 11primitive 11 nature of quantifiers, not by
saying that they attempt to provide an absolute correspondence between
things in the world and the variables of his logical systems, but rather that
whatever quantifiers do, they do it 11without saying what those values are".

152 Peirce, C. S., "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution
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